

Major General Glenn F. Spears
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MAJOR GENERAL GLENN F. SPEARS, USAF: Thank you, Jackie. You're very kind. I'll certainly do my best. It's a bit daunting, if you will, to be representing U. S. Southern Command with this august panel. If nothing else, I think this panel speaks well for the Defense Department's efforts at creating joint officers. I find it pretty amazing to see three Airmen speaking about the importance, the vital importance, of maritime strategy. And I also firmly believe that it speaks very well about how important we all see the value of jointness and knowing that we must work together.

It's exciting for me to bring warm greetings from my boss, Admiral Stavridis, who, as some of you know, is a graduate of the Fletcher School. He has his doctorate in law and diplomacy so, not only am I significantly out-manned by rank, but I've got big shoes to fill in that regard. And I'll give it my best shot.

I would like to spend a few minutes, and to use some visuals to help me tell the story, talking about what we in U. S. Southern Command do, and how we support U. S. national security, partnering with all segments of the U. S. government and with partner nations. In particular, I'd like to highlight some of the great capabilities that our sea services bring to the region and how we face a wide variety of non-traditional and evolving challenges in our particular region of the world. If I could have the second slide, as a unified combatant command, Southern Command is responsible for military operations and equally, if not more importantly, promoting security cooperation throughout this vast—(We think it's vast-- Not as large as PACOM, but it's relatively big—vast) and diverse region. The Southern Command region covers approximately one-sixth of the world's surface, some 16 million square miles, includes 32 sovereign nations and 13 territories in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. It certainly also includes the surrounding maritime commons and, on occasion, I remind my boss,

Admiral Stavridis, that from an Airman's perspective, it also includes the commons of air space and cyberspace.

Well, this huge area includes the mountains of the Andes, the Chaco Plains, the vast area of the Amazon, and tiny, Caribbean island nations. It's surrounded by two oceans, capped by the Caribbean Sea, and it is both divided and united by that very important Panama Canal. It's a land of half a billion people who represent a wonderful variety of cultures and religions and ethnic heritages. It's a land of many languages: Spanish, Portuguese, French and English. The countries these people call home reflect a vast diversity in dramatic fashion. Next slide, please. For example, could there be two more different countries than Chile and Haiti? Chile, represented on the left part of the slide. Haiti, on the right. Chile is a Spanish-speaking country, a very mature democracy, economically well-developed. In fact, Chile has more international trade agreements than any other country in the world. Haiti, on the other hand, French Creole-speaking, a struggling democracy, to be kind, and requires some nine thousand United Nations peace-keepers to provide security and stability. They have little trade in Haiti and, in fact, depend on remittances from their countrymen living in other nations, for more than a quarter of their gross domestic product. Next slide allows me to compare Brazil and Belize. Brazil, a Portuguese-speaking nation, the largest country in South America. Larger, in fact, than the continental United States, with almost 190 million people. And it is nearly energy-independent. Compare that to Belize, a very small English-speaking nation, the size of New Hampshire, with one-quarter its population.

These diversities could not be more striking to me, so it could be interesting to consider that diversity, and then ask what's the common ground for regional security?

In fact, some have asked, "What are the U. S. interests in this region?" The key is that, in this diversity, there's great strength, for there are strong and, I believe, nearly unbreakable linkages, unbreakable bonds, between this region of the world and the United States. The linkages are physical. They are geographic. They are historic, they are economic, they are even biological. We share DNA within the Americas. We share common values of democracy, and respect for human rights. Witness, if you will, just this

month, within our own nation, a democratic presidential candidate debate in Spanish, covered by Univision, a Spanish network which is the fifth largest television network in the United States. This, I think, emphasizes, the growing cultural and human connections among the Americas.

Well, the bottom line is that Latin America and the Caribbean share a common interest with the United States, and we with them. We are fortunate that, of the thirty-five nations in the whole Western Hemisphere, thirty-four are democracies. There are no kinetic state-on-state conflicts, and the probability of such in this hemisphere is low.

This is a part of the world where it's highly unlikely that we'll be launching air-to-air missiles. We won't be launching Tomahawk Cruise Missiles, or even 5.56 millimeter rounds downrange. But it is not only likely, it is essential that we launch and sustain cooperative ideas. Next slide, please. Ideas which are foundations for successful and lasting partnerships, and cooperative approaches.

These ideas allow us to work with government, with industry, with academia, and with partner nations, to achieve U. S. security objectives, and to support the stability and prosperity in our shared home of the Americas. It is these three things-- ensuring security through cooperative efforts and, in turn, enhancing the stability of the region and thereby creating the environment conducive to prosperity, that summarize Southern Command's strategic objectives. Next slide.

Given these objectives, let me briefly discuss some of the challenges in this region. They are many, and they are complex. Narco-terrorism, crime and urban gangs, illicit trafficking of all manner, support to trans-national terrorism, and past and certainly the potential for future mass migrations. Then there are always the ever-present natural disasters that befall us, especially in the Caribbean and Central America.

But note, if you will, please, that these challenges have some common denominators. They are all trans-national. Trans-national. And none of them can be solved by classic,

military, defense department missions. They demand cooperative regional response. Next slide.

Maritime initiatives play a major role in providing this cooperative response. Even if we double the United States Navy and the U. S. Coast Guard fleet, we would never be able to secure the region's maritime domain by ourselves. But, by building a multi-national capability, a maritime partnership for the Americas, to cooperatively meet these challenges, we can secure this terrifically important, vitally important maritime domain. Many years of joint and combined exercises provide the building blocks for this capability.

One such example is the Unitas exercise, which began in 1959. It is our nation's longest-running security cooperation exercise. Another is the Panamax exercise which, in its latest iteration, brought together nineteen nations in a series of events designed to enhance both maritime domain awareness and to protect the Panama Canal. Unitas, Panamax, and other exercises, have been instrumental in strengthening the relationships among the United States and our Latin American naval, marine, and coast guard partner forces. This promotes inter-operability, encourages the sharing of best practices, and allows us to develop the command, the control and the communication framework needed for successful coalition operations.

And we recently re-proved this framework in a real world operation, whereas you'll remember, just earlier this month, as Panamax was drawing to a close, Hurricane Felix, a category five hurricane, struck Central America. The U. S. S. Wasp, and the Samuel B. Roberts, who were participating in Panamax, were re-tasked on the fly to support humanitarian relief efforts. Together with other DOD and partner-nation forces, they provided over five hundred thousand pounds of life-saving relief supplies.

Let me now tell you about two other initiatives that I believe are success stories playing out right now in Southern Command. Next slide. The U. S. hospital ship, Comfort, has been sailing the waters to our south for the past three-and-a-half months, bringing the

solid message that the United States cares for this region. Her crew has delivered urgently needed free medical care to about eighty thousand people in more than three hundred thousand separate procedures, ranging from well-baby care to cleft pallet surgery to major spinal cord surgery. The art of deploying a one thousand bed floating hospital in a coordinated effort, linking multiple government agencies and non-governmental organizations, including U. S. Navy, the Air Force, Coast Guard, Army, public health service, Canadian forces, and charitable organizations, such as Project Hope, uniting them on a mission of friendship and cooperation within our home of the Americas, I believe, is a prime example of the international and public-private cooperative partnerships at their finest. And these partnerships are vital for the success of our mission. Next slide.

This is a picture that some of you will recognize of another great ship sailing the seas in our region, the high-speed vessel Swift. It is a pilot platform for the Navy's global fleet station initiative, aimed at strengthening U. S. global partnerships through training and security cooperation activities. Where the Comfort is extending our hand to the civilian populace, Swift is extending a hand to our partner nation militaries and security forces conducting security cooperation missions. What's so special about the Swift, besides its unique appearance? From a technological standpoint, it's a pretty amazing ship. It's an aluminum-hulled, wave-piercing catamaran that can speed at 45 knots. Now, that's not quite the speed of an F-18, or an F-22 but, for a boat, that's pretty fast. It has a helicopter flight deck, heavy-duty vehicle deck, boat launch and recovery capability, and an enhanced communication suite. Its modular design allows the ship to be reconfigured for any mission, in a short period of time. And its control system is so advanced that it can practically run itself. It certainly requires a very small crew. Its acquisition and development were equally amazing. Streamlined practices got it launched in less than a year, and it is leased by the U. S. Navy. It was not purchased. It has a joint Coast Guard, Navy and Marine training teams about, during its cruise within our region. And they are working with our partner nations from seven different countries to provide training on port security, medical readiness, engine repair, coxswan duties, and patrol craft operations. Next slide.

And the national strategy for maritime security of the United States has laid out three broad maritime security challenges. Southern Command strategy, and its core objectives of security, stability, and prosperity for our region, are consistent with, and support, the national maritime security strategy.

By implementing these activities, exercises, and operations, incorporating non-traditional stake-holders, public and private organizations, as well as using all elements of the United States government, in the maritime and in other domains, we believe that we will successfully meet the challenges today and in the future. I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.

Questions for the Panel

DR. DAVIS: As we're getting ready for questions, and the microphone is working its way down the room, I have several questions. One for each of the panel members. Tim, for you it's kind of a nerved question: Where is missile defense in your integrated priority list, and should the navy dedicate platforms to national missile defense?

For you, Gene, my question has to do with the Punaro Commission. The recommendations of Arnold's report will have implications for the ability to tap the reserve components to do missions in the homeland. What is your assessment of some of the issues that might be raised, from the perspective of your command and, also, a separate issue, a nerved question, if you will: With respect to-- You were talking about sleeper cells. For example, a dirty bomb scenario in the United States. What legal authorities do you need that you feel you do not have, to mobilize quickly and react to the situation. General Schwartz, for you, you mentioned that you believe in the aftermath of OIF, however we come out of this situation in Iraq, that your budget will probably be cut in half, according to the figures you suggested.

In that context, how will you meet your priorities, and how will you designate priorities for what you need, with only half of the budget that you're now operating with? And, finally, General Spears, in terms of your AOR, should U. S. military forces be engaged in counter-drug missions? That's a huge debate with respect to U. S. forces in Afghanistan. It's also been an ongoing debate with regard to your AOR. And, finally, a second question for you, with respect to the HSV. I noticed you said air force, coast guard, and navy. What about the army connector requirements? Is the army involved in this program, or not? Tim.

ADMIRAL KEATING: Mostly, missile defense is a significant factor force in the Pacific Command. It is both a regional and a national concern for us. Gene, as a commander in Northern Command, has greater responsibilities for ground-based, mid-course interceptors, and their command and control. We play an interesting role there, in that we live in a state that we don't have release authority for missiles that are based in Alaska and California. We're addressing that. Then, of course, there's the aspect of coalition support. Japan, an eager and willing partner in developing ballistic missile defense command and control capabilities. They are buying Asia's cruisers. They have Asia's cruisers. They're pursuing surface to air missile systems that could provide for the defense of Japan. Their constitutional concerns about-- attendant to defending forces other than Japanese forces-- It's an ongoing debate in Japan. So writ large, ballistic missile defense is a significant factor for the Pacific Command and it is both a regional and a theater concern and a coalition concern.

ADMIRAL KEATING: I'm not.

?: I thought you said we're addressing that issue.

DR. DAVIS: Is that a STRUTCOM (?) issue or is that a NORTHCOM issue?

GENERAL RENUART: No, we don't want to start a debate right off the bat, but let me make a couple of points clear. Right now, the decision by our government is that

attacks against the homeland, whether they are Hawaii, Alaska, California, or you-name-it, are attacks against the homeland, and they are then dealt with in a mid-course intercept process by Commander, NORTHCOM. Admiral Keating clearly has a huge set of issues with respect to the theater aspect of this. There are some who would say, "Well, they're also a, if you will, a boost-phase capability, and that is true. I'm an A10 pilot, so I'm not really good at nuclear physics or missile physics, but the window for engaging something in boost-phase is pretty narrow.

So, we're working these issues of how do we have a transparent, common-operating picture, so that we all see the same information; we all can make the same assessment, but then the nation makes a decision. In some cases, if it's a theater response, then PACOM is clearly involved in that. But we both see the same sets of information, and we can both respond the same way because, very quickly, if it's not a theater threat, if it's something that is actually committed to the homeland, it very rapidly becomes a national threat, and we pick up with that. So, what the key is that is being addressed is how do we create that common operating picture, so both of us see the same sets of data and can make a similar assessment. Is that fair?

ADMIRAL KEATING: Exactly.

DR. DAVIS: Gene?

GENERAL RENUART: I'm struggling a little bit on the Punaro Commission, because I'm not sure I know what it is you really asked. But let me just make a couple of statements.

DR. DAVIS: I'm getting to the heart, still, of it. We may have solved some of the inter-agency issues that we've seen before in top-off exercises, etc. But we have not resolved yet this issue of governor's having access to resources that we may need to federalize--

GENERAL RENUART: Yes. That's an inaccurate statement. We have absolutely come to a good understanding of how governors get access to the equipment they need in their states. Admiral Keating began an initiative as he was commander of NORTHCOM to place in each of the FEMA regions a defense coordinating officer. This is a post-brigade command army colonel, who knows how to lead and knows how to do stuff. And these officers have begun a detailed analysis within each of their FEMA regions, on the gaps between what a state has to respond to an event, and what the surrounding states, through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact have to support. And, then, what shortfalls are there for either federal civilian agencies or federal military agencies. The issue that was brought up in the Punaro Commission, that talked about governors needing the ability to command everything in their states is an interesting statement, but also terribly ill-informed. The governors, and I've been now to eighteen states, seen sixteen governors, two deputy governors, all emergency management directors, all the tags (?). I've seen twenty-seven tags in the first nine months I've been in the job. All of them agree that, when you define what command is, and all of us live in this world: we know what command is.

That's not what the governors want. They want to be able to direct what happens in their state. They want the people of the state to look and see the governor and the adjutant general in that state, in charge. And they will be. Our job is to ensure that the governor, through the established process that we have, has a capability to reach in to federal resources. Any Minnesota residents in the audience? No. How does the navy not have any Minnesota people? Well, governor Palenti in Minnesota understands what NORTHCOM brings, and understands exactly how to get access, too. And the United States navy provided a team of great patriots, salvage divers that went up there and recovered the remains of eight people unaccounted for. The state didn't have a capacity to do that. It wasn't a Title 10, Title 32 argument, it was what capability do you need? How do we get it there? They were there under the command of our defense coordinating officer, under the Title 10 OPCOM of that office, who was working for the sheriff in the county. So, while the secretary has been very supportive of the Punaro Commission, and he should be, that particular one is one that the secretary has not been supportive of, I am

not supportive of and, I think, frankly, was a recommendation built on ill-informed information. But I don't have a strong opinion about it so, let me help you with that.

Let me shift a little bit to talk-- You asked a question about potential for an RDD, and what legal authorities do I need? I think Admiral Keating would say the same thing. There's been a lot of political discussion about the insurrection act, and state's rights, and all of these sorts of things. That is periphery to our being able to accomplish our mission. Admiral Keating said the same thing as both of us were sitting side-by-side in our confirmation hearings.

The federal government will make a decision, in an event. If the response to that event is left with the state, with federal support, or if it is an event of such significance that the president, doesn't matter which party-- That the president decides has to be a national event. An RDD has as much of a psychological impact-- Probably more of a psychological impact than it does a physical impact on the surrounding communities. But the president will have to decide: Is that something that, because of the nature of radiation being released and affecting populations, how do we respond to that as a nation? Is it a one-off event? Is it multiple events? Are three or four or six states all affected by it? And so it really doesn't affect the legal authorities that I have, save one. And that is, if the need for public security and/or law enforcement is so significant that Title 10 forces need to augment the existing guard forces, either in state-active duty or Title 32, that we need, then, a declaration by the president to invoke provisions under law to allow federal Title 10 military to conduct law enforcement. And that's a whole, separate legal agreement-- Discussion that will have to occur by the principals of leadership in our nation. And then we will comply with whatever's decided. And I don't have a strong opinion about that, either.

DR. DAVIS: No. No. General Schwartz.

GENERAL SCHWARTZ: What he's (?) referring to, Jackie, was the brutal reality that our workload, which is considerable at the moment, and the latest example of that is

moving MRAPS, will subside. And that equates in dollars to what we referred to. I think the key point on this is that, in a scenario where we had less work to go around, where everybody's not busy, there is a downside to having too much government capacity. Because it competes with those civilian, those commercial partners who we want to keep viable in peace time, so that they're around to support us when the red star cluster goes up. And so that's really the issue that is important to articulate, I believe, is that too much organic sea lift capability, just like too much organic airlift capability, is as potentially damaging as too little.

DR. DAVIS: Thank you very much. General Spears.

GENERAL SPEARS: Thanks, Jackie. You asked if we believe that U. S. military forces should be engaged in the counter-drug mission. Short answer is, I believe yes. This is a national threat, in my humble opinion. Every year, twenty thousand U. S. citizens are killed from the direct, and indirect, results of illicit drugs. Ten thousand of those from cocaine. And cocaine is principally grown, as many of you know, within the Southern Command region. With that threat to our nation, I believe it's our military's responsibility to be engaged in, at the appropriate level, this fight. We break it down into the demand zone, here within our country; the transit zone; and the supply zone. We work with partner nations to reduce the supply. We work to provide detection and monitoring capability through the Joint Inter-agency Task Force, south, located at Key West that has both U. S. military, it has inter-agency, and it has multi-national representatives, who all work together in, I believe, a prime example of inter-agency and multi-national success on that detection and monitoring mission. Then there's the demand zone, which is not our responsibility. So the short answer is, yes, I believe that the nation's armed forces should be part of that fight.

The second question you asked was about the Swift, and the participation of the U. S. Army. As a COCOM, honestly, I don't care which service procures it or operates it. We need the capability. We see the best advantage of a Swift-like vessel, and I need to focus on the capability, not just on one platform or another. But we are very intrigued by its

capability in the security cooperation and the humanitarian assistance disaster response role.

Admiral Keating described the importance of presence. The Swift, for the last few months, and a Swift-like capability in the future, can and will provide consistent U. S. presence, especially in the Caribbean and Central American regions, where our presence is very important to improve the partner capacity of the Central American and Caribbean nations, to be able to maintain domain awareness of their own maritime environment.

Thanks.

DR. DAVIS: Questions? Right here. Eric. ...(inaudible)

Q: Eric Ingraham (?) of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. I guess, as almost everybody knows, TSN, of the global maritime partnership, is intended to do much more than just to go cheap cooperation between navies, has civil aspects and so forth. General Renuart, you brought up the prospect of aviation being included. I don't know whether this is a fair panel to address that. I would correct General Spears. You said there are three airmen. Well, there are four aviators sitting up there, so-- And the guy with the microphone-- His hand is another, so maybe we're a little biased. But I say, seriously, I wonder if we attempt to include aviation, whether we unnecessarily at this time complicate something that we're all trying to get straight, or whether there are some examples from aviation, though once again I may be showing my bias, I'd say that I K. O. the international civil aviation organization. Probably, it's a bit more mature and advanced and does something's more aggressively, and so forth, so maybe there are some lessons to be learned there. Anyway, I thought it was interesting idea, and would wonder if this panel would say a few words about now, never, bad idea, good, idea, to consider putting these two together, or expanding them in this way?

DR. DAVIS: Anyone want to take that on?

A: You are correct. There will be a point where-- Sometimes good ideas are not quite at their time, but what I was trying to describe is the construct that we are working, among all of our services now, in the aviation domain, and that is the means to communicate a common operating picture. For many-- It used to be in the fighter world, we had data links. Today, we are creating a common data link picture among our airlift, our fighters, and many of the other of our aircraft. Our bomber fleet, for example. But what if we had a common data link, and I'll use Link 16 as a good example of a type of data link to where we could share threat information, we could share the great capacity that exists in air-to-surface sensors, radars and others, that could be shared and merged with the common picture that is created by the commercial shipping industry situation awareness, that they require on vessels of certain sizes and speeds, to then allow for, if you will, an FAA picture, an IKO picture, but on the surface as well as in the air. Could we then prioritize targets of interest, vessels of interest, information pieces, to try and merge together in a way that could help you identify what items in that picture you ought to pay closest attention to. Today, on any given day, there are 70 to 80 thousand flights, turning around just within the borders of our country.

We launch NORAD fighters every day to intercept one or two or more of those, who are non-compliant. And where they're not complying, there is at least a decision matrix that says, "Are they not complying to the degree that they could become a threat? And if they're a threat, what do we do about it?" How much better it would be if we could thin down those targets to the points that we know so much about the rest, that you only pay attention to those that could become a real concern. So that's really the construct that I was talking about. Certainly, today, we use IKO and other organizations to build and maintain situational awareness on aircraft flying. Similarly, in the maritime domain, could we take advantage of the ability to move data among those platforms, to sense vessels at sea, as well. So that's kind of the construct that I was trying to describe

DR. DAVIS: Eric, you spoofed us all, we thought you were going to ask a China question to Admiral Keating, so Admiral Keating I will ask you this question. If the six-party talks succeed, and I know that's a long pull, but if the six-party talks continue along

the track, and a peace regime is declared on the Korean peninsula, or defined, or negotiations are working toward, and it has implications for U. S. Forces, Korea, and our presence on the peninsula-- In light of that situation, and given the skittishness that many nations have about base access-- Permanent base access for U. S. forces, what do you see the implications of going down that road for PACOM planning, and what would be the roll of naval, and off-shore forces, and power-- U. S. power in that scenario, do you think?

ADMIRAL KEATING: Regardless of six-party talk progress, there will be a rather watershed change-- I don't know if you can have a rather watershed-- There will be a significant change on the peninsula in April of 2012. That is the shift of wartime operational control will occur between US BBill, USFK, CFC and the United Nations command, that tri-hatted fellow that has historically, since the armistice, retained operational command. It will shift to South Korean control. That's a very big deal. BB and we are engaged in all manner of what if's and what's the staff going to look like, and where will the staffs move, and so on. The importance of maritime and aviation forces-- U. S. and Coalition in that transition, is significant, to say the least, and it is a matter of some discussion in certain parts of the government, as to what sort of commander would we like to have when that eventuality, that April 2012, comes to pass? So the execution of war plans that are on the shelf and that will be revised as this wartime operational control shift occurs, those reconsiderations are ongoing at our headquarters and with BB and with some of our allies in the theater.

DR. DAVIS: Robbie Harris.

HARRIS: Robbie Harris. A question for General Spears and Admiral Keating. General Spears, when the Swift finishes its current global fleet station deployment to the Caribbean, what are the plans for the continuation of global fleet station in your AOR? And Admiral Keating, do you have plans within your AOR for a global fleet station?

GENERAL SPEARS: Thank you, Rodney. My understanding, and someone else correct me if I've got it wrong, but my understanding is that the lease for the Swift expires, I believe, in spring of 2008. There's not much time left on the lease. The vessel returns to port. Our follow-on plan is either to extend the lease on the Swift, or to get another, similar vessel, and similar capability to continue that security-cooperation mission within the Caribbean. Our idea for the long-term is to have a continued presence in the Caribbean region, perhaps a multi-national crew on this Swift-like vessel. Some may have served, or some may know about what used to be called the Gentian, which was a U. S. Navy ship, multi-nationally crewed, used as a Caribbean support tender. And it had a similar mission of continued presence in the Caribbean to provide training and assistance to our partner coast guards, principally, but some of the smaller navies as well. It also has the terrific capability to respond rapidly in humanitarian assistance disaster relief operations. It's a wonderfully flexible capability. Thanks for the question.

DR. DAVIS: Well, Tim, there are two things.

ADMIRAL KEATING: Ask that again. Say it again, please. You were cut off.

Q: If we get hung up with China, ...(inaudible) If we get hung up with China on global maritime partnership, and it's now time to re-ask the question, approach it from another avenue, is it possible to do something like, say, "Well, now we're expanding it. It includes aviation." You don't have to worry about the Taiwan aspect of it, too much. Some little effort like that.

ADMIRAL KEATING: I'll try. I'm not sure. If I don't get it right, let me know. I don't see any-- I need to be careful-- I don't see any area where we are not at least considering discussing, if not discussing issues like this with the People's Republic of China. We have an active engagement under-- And it's not just PACOM. It's State, and Treasury, and Commerce, and Energy, and so the likelihood of reaching an impasse with them, I think, is small if not very remote. But I don't know if I'm-- And so, whether it's the

maritime domain, or a presence in the Western Pacific, I am not concerned about it on a day-to-day basis.

ADMIRAL KEATING: Yes, Okay. Well, the issue of Taiwan figures prominently in any discussion we have with our PRC interlocutors or hosts. While I was a little surprised at the vigor with which they chose to pursue the subject. And I think Mike Mullin just got back and would characterize it the same way. On a one-to-ten, it was about a six to a six-and-a-half, and I expected a five. All that said, there is nothing, absent the rhetoric of the outgoing president of Taiwan, there is nothing that causes us more than the constant concern that we demonstrate, that we evince, that we demonstrate about peace and stability in Taiwan and on the mainland and across the strait. It's something we do not think at all likely. We're prepared, don't get me wrong. But we don't think it's ...(inaudible).

DR. DAVIS: And, Tim, fleet stations? Robbie's question.

ADMIRAL KEATING: I think Glenn mentioned a little bit. I don't know that we have an active program. Stosh, you may help me, if we are pursuing fleet stations, by that name, in the Pacific. It is more the capability in which we're interested. We're we have used high-speed vessels, and we'd like more. Some of you may know there's a huge brouhaha in Hawaii now, over a particular high-speed ferry. It is just a dog's breakfast of issues. But fleet stations, per se, I can't say that we are planning on them. It's more the capability in which we're interested. To move-- You know, we tend to move a lot of marines out of Okinawa down to Guam. It is that sort of capability that may transfer to a fleet station closer to Guam, but we're not calling it a fleet station, to my knowledge.

CAPTAIN MATTHEW FEELEY, USN.: Good morning, I'm Captain Matt Feeley, from the Defense Logistics Agency. Whether we're referring to joint operations in the maritime domain or inter-agency operations in the maritime domain, or commercial-military partnerships, or trans-national operations, there's an implicit, if not explicit, need for information fusion, information sharing, idea sharing-- All of which, in turn, require

robust communications capabilities and, while most of us focus on the technological impediments to good communications, such as classified networks versus non-classified networks, and radio frequency compatibility, etc., etc., I'm wondering if any of the panel members might care to comment on what I see as a problem, and that is pure linguistics. I'm not talking about Spanish versus English, or Portuguese versus English, but I'm talking about the normal, in our case, DOD parlance, or the DOD jargon that is, frankly, indecipherable for a lot of the people with whom we're trying to partner. Is there a need to address the linguistics matter underlying communications problems and, if so, how might we do that?

A: You know, frankly, in terms of fundamentals, you know, English remains the common language of business, and that's unlikely to change. But with regard to jargon, you know, I've got to tell you, each discipline has its own specific kind of treatment of words and what-have-you, that are specific to that discipline. It's true in the transportation industry. It's true in medicine. I mean, you know, frankly I don't see that as all that threatening. The key thing is that people who interact, and who do business together, need to understand one another, and the truth of the matter is that machines, and machine-communication is much more difficult to be misunderstood. And it's why Fred Smith and other titans of industry are investing heavily in IT. You know, Fred Smith told me one time, "I invest 2.2 billion a year in IT." And he says, "So am I an IT business, or am I a transportation company?" Fair question, and the answer is "Yes."

DR. DAVIS: Unfortunately, ladies and gentlemen, we have to cut this session off right now because these gentlemen have other things to do, as you can well imagine. Having said that, before we thank them, however, General Renuart has offered, very graciously, to stay here for fifteen minutes to talk to the press, if there are any additional questions. But with that, I would like us all to thank the panel for a brilliant presentation.

