

**Transcript Of General Gene Renuart
IFPA-Fletcher Institute Conference On Maritime Security, 27 Sep 07**

GENERAL GENE RENUART, USAF: Thanks. I appreciate a really great opportunity to be here, and I am somewhat dismayed. My friend, my warrior bud, how could you possibly believe that those boat people can overcome all those air people on the field of friendly strife?

ADMIRAL KEATING: History speaks. Recent history. Recent history.

A: You don't have a full-back, this year.

GENERAL RENUART: Well, me and Billy Mitchell have a view of things afloat. It'll be a great day, by the way, out at Annapolis this week, and I wish the Naval Academy all good things, just not victory.

Tim, Norty, Glenn: great to be up here with you, and I really appreciate the chance to speak on this panel today. The more important part is to field your questions because you'll probably forget what we say, but you won't forget the answer we give you, especially if we disagree with your opinion. So, the opportunity for a forum like this is really critical to us. I sit between two guys that I have been between on a number of occasions. Admiral Keating would call me from his job as the NAVCENT Commander, as we prepared for OEF and then OIF, and fuss at me about things that the Joint Staff couldn't provide. And then I'd call Norty, as the J-3 of the Joint Staff, and fuss at him about things that the Joint Staff didn't provide. So we've got a great relationship, and continue to do that. And, as Dr. Davis mentioned, sitting here with your predecessor is also a little bit of a challenge. So, I'll try to add to what Admiral Keating has said, in terms of the importance of a few areas in our national maritime strategy, and why we have to continue to evolve this over time.

When I took command from Tim, one of the first questions that the media asked me in my first interview was, "So, what are the things that will keep you up at night, as the Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM? And certainly there were a lot of things

**Transcript Of General Gene Renuart
IFPA-Fletcher Institute Conference On Maritime Security, 27 Sep 07**

that I didn't know about that were going to keep me awake for a long time, and still do. But, one of which, that we continue to spend a lot of time and effort on, is the construct that the two nations, Canada and the United States, have tasked a bi-national command, NORAD, North American Aerospace Defense Command, to conduct the mission of maritime warning. That's a tough issue for a command that—you know, we flew over the water. We protected our nations. But we really didn't pay much attention. We assumed that naval forces did that. But today we have a commitment by two countries that this bi-national command will provide for the two nations' maritime warning of threats to the homeland. And that's a huge mission. And when you begin to ask yourself, "What does that mean," you begin to see the spider web go out through a variety of those service programs, as well as national concerns. But creating maritime situational awareness, and the contributions that we will make to maritime warning, is a principal concern that I have in my role.

One of the pros of adding this mission to NORAD was the fact that we can take advantage of capabilities that we've had in place for a number of years, relationships that we had established over time that are effective, that are comfortable with information-sharing, and that have allowed both nations to focus on threats outside the country, and the challenge to security that they may pose inside the borders of the country.

The challenge for us today at NORAD and USNORTHCOM, is to create an integrated picture of the maritime domain, so that we know what to warn against. And as Admiral Keating mentioned, the volume of traffic that moves through that domain is substantial. It is fraught with places where bad things can hide until they're on your front doorstep, and we can't afford to allow the nation to suffer a 9/11 type event through the maritime domain, as we did through the air domain, just a few years ago.

As USNORTHCOM completes its fifth year of operations, we've really put a sharper focus on the mission. We're actively working to implement the Secretary's EXORD (Execution Order) that has been published on maritime homeland defense. And our task, in all of that, is to conduct homeland defense operations to include EMIO (Expanded

**Transcript Of General Gene Renuart
IFPA-Fletcher Institute Conference On Maritime Security, 27 Sep 07**

Maritime Interception Operations), to allow us to defend at range those enemies that would challenge us through the air, land, or the maritime.

In addition, we work hard to partner with our friends in Homeland Security in their mission of maritime homeland security. And so, as we break that down, what we really try to do, as I mentioned earlier, is defend at range. We want to make sure that we identify, collaborate on, intercept if necessary, and defend the nation from those threats that are out there every day trying to take advantage of the seams, the vulnerabilities that we enjoy in our societies.

We work hard with DHS folks, as I mentioned, as that means a great relationship with Border and Customs, with the Coast Guard, with the ATF folks, a variety of international agencies as well, in Canada and in Mexico, to help identify threats in the maritime domain, and then allow countries to make the national decisions on how they want to deal with them.

The interesting dynamic with all this is that we bump up against a variety of other combatant command entities. General Schwartz is the process owner for all of the logistics support to all of our services out there. And so he's moving in and amongst all these other ships that are at sea. He's moving the sustainment that we need in order to protect and re-supply the forces that we have deployed around the world.

Both of the two commands, USSOUTHCOM and USPACOM, and certainly as well as USEUCOM, have battle space that, I won't say bumps up against ours, because our battle space is becoming increasingly transparent. So, how do we integrate the sensors in a way that allows Admiral Keating, and Admiral Stavridis, to see the same picture that we see at USNORTHCOM and assess what the threat is, and how do you engage that threat, at range. Admiral Keating has an additional requirement to ensure that he provides for the homeland defense of Hawaii, and the U. S. Territories in the Pacific. So, many of the same tasks that he had, as commander of NORTHCOM, he has today as commander of PACOM.

**Transcript Of General Gene Renuart
IFPA-Fletcher Institute Conference On Maritime Security, 27 Sep 07**

The relationship between our two commands is continuing to become more integrated, and must be so, as we move into the future. The national strategy for maritime security says that the U. S. has a vital interest in maritime security, and that we must be prepared to stop terrorists, rogue states, and the like, before they can threaten or use weapons of mass destruction, or engage in attacks against the U. S. and our allies and friends. And those can be pretty strong words if you do not have a network, a system, a structure behind them to make that a reality. All of our commands have a strategic imperative to anticipate the vulnerabilities to our homeland, and to provide capability to reduce those potential threats.

As Admiral Keating mentioned, there are times when we must, and will, stand alone. Where we must be pre-emptive in our nature, in our response, and that we must be decisive. But, in every case, we always have a better chance of success, and international acceptance, when we can do that with our partners. And so the ability to provide that same transparent situational awareness to our coalition friends is critical. And you all have gone through hell in a gasoline suit on issues of information-sharing with our coalition partners, and how difficult that can be. In the homeland defense world, all of our partners in the interagency, all of our partners in the civilian organizations of government of other nations, operate in the unclassified mode. So how do we take the intelligence that's critical to provide warning, and feed that to a coalition partner in a way that they can take advantage of and use. Big challenges, and things that we've got some efforts underway to try to improve.

We can't afford to under-react when we see the threats. We have to be in a position where we can be decisive, where we work procedures amongst our partners, and where we can again defend at range. None of us can afford to have another 9/11.

I want to bore you with a few more statistics because, while I think Admiral Keating touched on some of them, as they relate to the homeland, they are staggering. Thirty-five million square miles of U. S. jurisdiction to monitor and protect. And about another

**Transcript Of General Gene Renuart
IFPA-Fletcher Institute Conference On Maritime Security, 27 Sep 07**

twenty-five thousand miles of inland waterways. Major ports: Boston, Chesapeake Bay, Charleston, Houston, San Francisco, Portland, Long Beach, and there are a ton more. How do you ensure that what goes into those ports you have good awareness of, you understand the threat that might be resident there, and then how do you respond to it?

Three Hundred and sixty-one official ports of entry. Some of those are pretty small. Seventeen of those being those huge, strategic ports that I just talked about. If you think about the volume of ship traffic that comes into those ports daily, somewhere around between twelve hundred and fifteen hundred commercial vessels, are in our ports each day, equating to about 215 million container shipments annually. Right now, of those vessels, we only receive customs declarations of vessels of three hundred gross tons, significantly limiting our visibility on smaller ships inbound to our coast, working within our coastal regions, and certainly transiting our waterways. It really limits our ability to understand where the threat might be, and where we're vulnerable. Which of these ships could contain precursors, not necessarily a weapon of mass destruction, but in our routine conduct of business, we move a variety of precursors to many of these weapons on a routine basis. How do you determine where the illegal, and the illicit, traffickers may be? How do you ensure that we keep oversight of those, as they make sixteen, eighteen, twenty port calls, moving around the world.

We've talked about oil and petroleum products. We transport over three billion tons of oil each year through our ports. Again, precursors. You just never know where a nation state or a non-nation player will choose to take advantage of it. As you know, we live close to our coasts. Many of us have retirement homes close to our coast. But those also become our most vulnerable. We have about five times the number of people living on our coastlines as we do in the interior of our country. Idaho seems to be a great place to retire, because it's a beautiful state, and good cost of living, and it's a long way from a lot of threats. But most people are looking for the golf course on Myrtle Beach. But all of those things—all of those desires for a quality of life, place us in a position where a large percentage of our population is vulnerable. And that is expected to increase by almost twenty-one million over the next seven or eight years in our country.

**Transcript Of General Gene Renuart
IFPA-Fletcher Institute Conference On Maritime Security, 27 Sep 07**

So how do we provide the kind of protection that we need to ensure that percentage of our population is protected? Fortunately, those of you that are here today, and many of us working in the combatant commands around our Department of Defense are focused on tackling the challenges of security in the maritime domain.

Our national strategy provides four objectives to guide these activities: prevent terrorist attacks and criminal, hostile acts; protect maritime-related population centers and critical infrastructures; minimize damage and expedite recovery; and safeguard the ocean and its resources.

To meet those, a number of priorities have to be pursued. For us at USNORTHCOM, and NORAD, the construct of maritime domain awareness is our number one. It sits at the top of my IPL (Integrated Priority List). It is what I argue most for when we sit in the JROC (Joint Requirements Oversight Council) discussions for funding. It is the thing that concerns me most. Today, a radar is just as critical to support of maritime domain awareness as it is of air domain awareness. We have passive and active technologies. Admiral Mike Mullin gave a briefing, about a year ago, on something he called the thousand ship navy. And it's a great construct, where you could network together the information of ships from nations, from commercial entities around the world. But how powerful could that be if it also then linked together air pictures? If we could create relay systems to commercial aircraft trafficking, where the oceans of our world could be relays for a variety of elements of information in the air picture? How good it would be if we could create passive systems that could be attached to our commercial aircraft that could monitor the maritime domain, so that we could find those less than three hundred gross ton vessels. So that we could understand that a big ship was off-loading to a smaller ship who was then off-loading to a fast boat, to move drugs from a thousand miles off the coast of California into one of the small ports that we don't pay a lot of attention to, every day, because we're tasked with a lot of other challenges.

**Transcript Of General Gene Renuart
IFPA-Fletcher Institute Conference On Maritime Security, 27 Sep 07**

How do we partner better with our friends in the Department of Homeland Security, so that their picture is the same as our picture? So it's not just a thousand-ship navy, it's a five hundred thousand sensor world that we have to live in, and we have to integrate, and we have to be able to take advantage of.

We sponsor two Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs) that are ongoing. First, a tool called the comprehensive maritime awareness tool, or CMA. It's a great product, with great potential, but it's not in anybody's POM right now. How do we continue to work to convince our programmers that this is as important as the next generation of pick-a-system from any one of our services? The second tool provides similar data, but at a highly classified level, and the goal of both of these JCTDs is to fuse information in a way that could be used by a federal agency, a coalition partner's agency, or our U. S. Military.

We really support both of these two JCTDs, and we're very grateful to the Navy and the Coast Guard, as well as the combatant commanders, for their partnership in these, as well. The Navy is, in many ways, leading the nation in terms of its vision of the future. I took a great briefing from the strategic studies group on cyberspace and how the Navy should posture itself for the future.

Clearly, how we deal in the maritime domain is something the Navy's thinking hard about, as it looks at its future. But, as Admiral Keating said, we're past the point where a single service, where a single agency can deal in this domain and be effective. We have to do this as a joint team. We have to do this as an interagency team. We have to do this as a coalition team. Those are the real challenges, and that's what keeps me up at night because I'm not sure we've created the integration of all of those in a way that can see the future, and then plan for it as we move forward.

Well, I look forward to the opportunity to talk about some of these topics further, and answer your questions, but I'd like to close with a little vignette on why this is so important to our team at NORAD and USNORTHCOM.

**Transcript Of General Gene Renuart
IFPA-Fletcher Institute Conference On Maritime Security, 27 Sep 07**

I've had a chance to do a few interviews. Admiral Keating was really nice to me. He told all the media that he didn't want to talk to that he would let me do it, after I showed up. So they were all standing on my doorstep as I was moving my household goods in. But they have asked, on a number of occasions, "Do you think there are terrorist threats inside our country, today?" And I said, "Yes, I do. I think you can't discount the fact there have been, and continue to be, people who are trying to take advantage of the freedoms we have to create challenges for our nation." If you know the history of Pearl Harbor, and I see Walt Dorn out here, we've heard this often: Japanese sleeper cells sat up the hill, almost where the USPACOM headquarters are today, to look down on Pearl Harbor and provide extensive maps of what was in the harbor, where the ships were moored, and fed that back.

Another story that I just found out about, and Admiral Allen's going to talk to you a little later on in the program, but he's told the story a couple of times, and it's a story of Black Tom Island. I apologize if you history buffs know about it, but I thought this was pretty interesting.

A summer night in July, New York Harbor was interrupted by a massive explosion. It registered 5.0 on the Richter Scale. Windows were blown out of every building on lower Manhattan. Shock waves were felt up to 90 miles away. People wondered what the cause was. Well, it wasn't an accident. It was something that was pre-planned. It was in retaliation for international sanctions we had placed against a country who had declared hostile intent against one of our strongest allies.

The blast was caused by a penetration of a waterfront facility and people wondered how they could possibly get into one of our highly guarded waterfront facilities. Well, sleeper cells. They were here in the country, under state sponsorship, and so, as Paul Harvey might once say, "the rest of the story," if you will, is that this event occurred about 90 years ago, in the end of July, 1916. Black Tom Island, which lay between Liberty Island and Jersey City, was literally evaporated with this explosion. Multiple barges, a ship,

Transcript Of General Gene Renuart
IFPA-Fletcher Institute Conference On Maritime Security, 27 Sep 07

several warehouses and over two million tons of explosives were headed to Great Britain at that time.

The Statue of Liberty was damaged, and it had a significant impact on our country. The guilty party? It was a work of saboteurs, sponsored by, at that time, the German government, who had been here during that time, and lived in our country for quite some period.

So, if we think that somehow these terrorist organizations will not try to infiltrate us, will not try to take advantage of our freedoms and our weaknesses, we're deceiving ourselves. And so we have to pay attention to the fact that somewhere in our country today, there are members of either Al Qaeda or an Al Qaeda-related or supportive organization, or some other radical entity who is going to try to do us harm. If we take our guard down, if we lose focus we, too, will experience another explosion like that on Black Tom Island. We can't afford to do that for the nation. Thank you.