

## **The Global Strategic Context for Future USN/Joint, Interagency and Allied-Coalition Partner Planning**

I. At the outset, and stating the obvious, the world has changed since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and more so since 9/11, and its strategic-operational realities—both those that have become more clearly defined and those that are now only just emerging—have had and will continue to have a profound influence on national security planning, Alliance relationships, and on the use of force as an instrument in the national “toolkit”.

II. Some of the more obvious changes are listed on this slide. In many respects, the new security planning environment is more complex than it was in the good old days of the U.S.-Soviet bipolar confrontation. Transnational, non-state actors have demonstrated that they can attain strategic effects, while legacy threats/challenges remain with us and demand attention as well. The jury is still out on Putin’s Russia, and China, while working with the United States on some issues, North Korean dismantlement for example, still views the United States as an adversary power in the context of Taiwan’s sovereignty and potentially for the competition of resources in the Middle East and Africa.

III. U.S. Alliance relationships are changing, and with them, assumptions about American access to bases and facilities overseas, as well as the employment of forces from Allied-coalition partner soil. Our experience with NATO has not been altogether satisfactory in Afghanistan due to the frustrations experienced by the imposition of national caveats and seams created over rules of engagement between ISAF and CENTCOM operations. Thus, while multilateral operations are preferred for political reasons, maintaining capabilities to fight unilaterally continues to drive U.S. planning, and this is creating new pressures on the defense budget and with respect to personnel and their rotational deployments.

IV. As we have seen with respect to Iraq, operations that are protracted and which are politically contentious have little prospect of reaching their desired end-game, unless public opinion can be convinced of their vital importance to U.S. national security and if the risks and costs of remaining engaged can be portrayed as being worthwhile to the overall objectives that are sought—something that thus far the Administration has had great difficulty in doing in an era of the 24-hour news cycle and amidst the new phenomenon of blogging.

V. This situation is only exacerbated by the tendency of Congress (in a political year) to attempt to micro-manage operational planning through the budget process. In the coming year, the need to find a way—if the top line of the budget is not raised—to rejuvenate the Army and the Marine Corps—both of which may be on the verge of “breaking” if some relief is not found to slow down operational tempos and overuse of its reserve forces will demand some difficult choices, and many fear that to fix the Army, funds will be siphoned off from USN and Air Force accounts.

VI. Obviously, the assumption of many on the Hill and elsewhere is that leaving Iraq will solve some of Defense’s budget pressures. However, the reality is that the Struggle

Against Radical Extremism (SAVE) will not end were we to exit Iraq precipitously; it may even exacerbate new threats/challenges, more immediately, Iran's regional power emergence. And, in this context, too, we will have to guard against a new "Vietnam-like syndrome" in which the willingness of the American people and its leadership to authorize/condone the use of force except in dire circumstances prevails as a major policy constraint in the post-Iraq era.

VII. Budget constraints also have the potential to stress U.S. planning for Irregular Warfare (IW) contingencies and Security Cooperation Planning (SC). As we struggle to balance forces modernization with rising personnel accounts and more expensive operational budgets, in part due to rising energy costs, **the question is where should or can we accept risks and how should we prioritize and leverage Joint, Interagency, and Allied-Coalition partner assets?**

VIII. And, finally, as Phase 0 planning is emerging as more important to CoCom and USG objectives, how can we align TSC planning with the need to influence elites, shape decision-making, and potentially to deter, dissuade, and compel state and non-state actor behaviors. This, of course, is an important element of deterrence planning, and will be more important in this post-9/11 world where the Cold War taboo on nuclear weapons use may no longer be accepted by actors who may look at the issue altogether differently from the "rational actor model" that we have come to embrace as our Western reality.

IX. The 2006 QDR established a construct for dealing with the post-9/11 world, but it failed to address in any great detail the implications of the changes that were described above, and which are alluded to in this slide.

X. The new Maritime Strategy, as currently conceived, and as was described to us earlier this morning also attempts to focus on the changed security planning environment, and in its own fashion made some assumptions about the issues depicted in the preceding slide (e.g., budget futures, new mission planning, and operational concepts), but it did so without resolving 8 key strategic and operational questions. For the sake of time, I won't discuss each of these issues, although I will point out that (! Strategic issue) resolving whether we will emphasis surge or presence deployments has far-reaching implications for the new Maritime Strategy.

XI. Likewise, how we develop the capacity to overcome the "speed of war" will be critical to reducing personnel pressures and Operational tempos.

XII. In conclusion, let me make a couple of points. Depending on how we answer the preceding questions, the Navy's partnerships with the USMC, the Coast Guard, and indeed with the Army and the Air Force will be delineated and refined. Do we get back to basics (JFEO) or is there a new way ahead (NECC)?

XIII. Secondly, the Navy may need to re-optimize certain skill-sets to deal with legacy challenges (ASW, for example), and create new ones (countering small boat SWARM

tactics) to confront IW and Cyber threats. In this context, we need to ask if, for example, the Navy should be engaged in anti-piracy operations, or if new platforms, the LCS, for example, are optimized for working with smaller coalition partner navies.

XIV. Iran and China will demand creative thought, and the evolution of their military power has implications for regional security planning, contingency operations and even for MTO assumptions. In particular, in this regard, but also in the context of the GWOT and efforts by non-state actors to provoke escalatory responses, U.S. strategic and operational planners need to rethink Cold War deterrence concepts, especially those associated with escalation management and operating in contaminated environments (as a result of WMD proliferation) and against an adversary or adversaries who may regard nuclear weapons quite differently than do we.

XV. In this respect, one of the most important issues that still needs considerable thought is that of the future of U.S. deterrence planning, and very specifically, the Navy's role in operationalizing the New Triad. Trident modernization looms large in this regard, as does the evolution of USN Aegis capabilities. A central question in this context is: "How far and fast should the Navy go in pursuing a national missile defense capability, and where is the cross-over between TMD and NMD in resourcing?"

XVI. And, finally, Phase 0 planning is assuming even greater importance in support of U.S. defense and dissuasion efforts, and in the context of reassuring allies and coalition partners. Non-kinetic IO planning is central to these efforts, as is the implementation of non-traditional missions (e.g., "Comfort Diplomacy") and JCET deployments.