

Admiral Thad W. Allen
Luncheon Address
IFPA-Fletcher Conference

DR. ROBERT PFALTZGRAFF: Given our speaker's schedule, I have been asked if we would have our luncheon speaker during your lunch, and, of course, we will do that. And, it is with great pleasure that I welcome Admiral Thad W. Allen who is, as you know in this room, all of you, Commandant of the Coast Guard. He became very well known to all of us who hadn't known him before during Hurricane Katrina. He came to the command responsibilities that he had there after very impressive service in this overall arena previously. He had served as Chairman of the Department of Homeland Security Joint Requirements Council from 2003 to 2006. He was designated the principal federal official for Hurricane Katrina response and recovery operations in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama during that tragic period just over two years ago.

Previously, he had held many operational assignments during a distinguished Coast Guard career. These assignments are too numerous to mention in an introduction here, but I would simply say they include Commander Coast Guard Atlantic area, and Coast Guard Chief of Staff. Admiral Allen is a graduate of the Coast Guard Academy, and he holds graduate degrees from George Washington University and the Sloan School of Management at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

So it is with very great pleasure that I welcome Admiral Allen on our collective behalf to talk about the U.S. Coast Guard and hopefully the broader context of a new maritime strategy.

Admiral Allen? [applause]

ADMIRAL THAD W. ALLEN: Let me do a sound check, I got a lapel mic. Everybody hear me okay? I get kinetic, I start walking around here. It's great to be with you here today. It's been an extraordinary year working with the Navy and the Marine Corps on maritime strategy. I'm sure you've heard a lot about it, and you'll hear a lot more about it.

I'm going to take a little different tack here at lunch today. I'm going to talk about something that's been on the front of *Time* magazine, in the papers, *USA Today* and so forth, and I'd like to give you a Coast Guard perspective of what's going on in the arctic in relation to where we're at in arctic policy. It's something that's been around for the last 10 or 20 years, but until the recent implications of climate change of surface and the reduction of sea ice in the arctic, there hasn't been a lot of national discussion about it, and I'd like to take a little bit of time today to do that with you if I could.

But before I do that, I thought I'd give you a little bit of a historical perspective visually, a little more entertaining than I am, and then I'd like to add and embellish on that a little bit. So if we could roll the videotape please?

[VIDEO]

ADMIRAL ALLEN: We are a Coast Guard of all coasts, east and west and north and south. You saw a little bit of an overview of our icebreaking capabilities. But what you saw right at the beginning were three Coast Guard buoy tenders, moored side by side. This year, we are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the first circumnavigation of North America by three Coast Guard cutters, the *Storis*, the *Spar* and the *Bramble* in September of 1957. At that time, we had constructed a series of dual line stations during the Cold War for early warning in the arctic, and the Navy had concerns after a heavy ice year about whether or not they could be re-supplied. And they wanted to do a test with Coast Guard vessels with icebreaking capabilities, not only to have access, but to do some mapping up there and create the ability to reach those stations should they need to do it.

And for my Navy friends in the room, apparently there was a meeting convened in Seattle with a Navy admiral who was asking if the Coast Guard would support it. And we walked in the room and he said, "I'm really glad to see that the hooligan navy is here." [laughter] And a very grizzled old salty sea captain said, "Well, sir, I don't have any problem with hooligan. I do object to the term navy." [laughter]

Actually, our link to the arctic and Alaska is a very old and storied link in the Coast Guard. Right after Alaska became in the possession of the United States in the mid-1860s, we dispatched in 1865 a U.S. lighthouse service tender up there to start working on the aids to navigation which were vital to shipping up there. In 1872, the Treasury Department, which we were part of at the time, sent somebody up to take a look at the Pribilof Islands and the seal rookeries which were being vastly exploited. That ultimately led to the first field treaty of 1911 which laid the groundwork for the Marine Mammal Protection Act in the United States.

But probably our most famous link with Alaska and the arctic came in the 1880s when we deployed the Coast Guard cutter *Bear* which served as a floating federal presence in Alaska. We transferred prisoners, it was a courtroom, we provided medical services, we carried the mail, we enforced the law. And the commanding officer of the *Bear*, a guy called Rory Mike Healy, had the idea to assist Eskimos who were facing starvation and famine from year to year depending on conditions, he went to Siberia and introduced reindeer to Alaska. And something that has permanently transformed the state. We found out that was a particularly wise decision because in 1897, eight whalers were stranded off the north coast of Alaska. There were 235 people on them, and the *Bear* could only get to just a little above Nome, 1600 miles away by land.

The *Bear* dispatched three officers. One of them was Mike Bertholf, who would become the first commandant of the modern Coast Guard in 1915 and with Eskimos and dog sleds, they started a 1600 mile trek over land driving 450 reindeer with them. And 3 ½ months later, they landed on the north coast of Alaska and rescued the stranded whalers in what has become now the Overland Expedition and a feat that's been unparalleled in Coast Guard history.

But I would tell you, history repeats itself. And earlier this new in April off Newfoundland, with sea ice, not hard packed ice, but sea ice that had broken free and was drifting, 100 sealers from Canada became trapped in the ice with 400 people and Canada required five icebreakers and a number of helicopters to bring in provisions until they ultimately freed those ships. The reason I bring these two incidents up is when you think about climate change, you think about a shrinking ice cap and the arctic, you think why should there be an issue with icebreakers? Well,

sometimes it's more difficult to deal with ice that is moving than ice that is hard and fast. And if you think about the missions that the United States Coast Guard carries out, search and rescue, law enforcement, environmental response, oil spill response, and you think about the time and distance equation of having to do that in the arctic region with or without ice or in the proximity of ice, it becomes very, very challenging.

In the 1980s, we had a cruise ship catch on fire in the Gulf of Alaska. We successfully evacuated everybody off the ship, 500 people, but we did it because we had helicopters nearby, we had a merchant vessel, the *Williamsburg* that we were able to use as a launch platform and successfully by knowing how fast the fire would spread, were able to save everybody. I don't know if you'd do that a hundred miles north of Point Barrow without a forward presence or a forward operating base to work from.

Two years ago, the *Celandine IU* was going through Unimak Pass in the Aleutians. Lost ability to maneuver, ran aground, broke in half, and deposited 300,000 gallons of oil in one of the most sensitive ecological bird nesting areas in Alaska. We had to mount an environmental response in an area that was virtually inaccessible. And in the process of trying to save the crewmen, we lost a helicopter.

Earlier this year, over 600 foot car carrier, the *Cougar Ace* made a mistake in ballasting, lifted over 90 degrees 230 miles south of the Aleutians. It took us 24 hours to get a helicopter on scene by ferrying them down, refueling them and finally getting them out there. We saved that vessel by slowing looking at the schematics, the design characteristics of the ship, working with our industry partners, but the time and distance equation of that case when it was south of the Aleutians still almost overwhelmed us. But ultimately, the ship was salvaged without a loss of life, without an oil spill, without all the legal problems attendant thereto to all that other stuff.

Just this summer, there's a small town 90 miles north of the Arctic Circle, Kivalina. It's a spit of land that has no road access, everything has to be barged in. In 2006, they built a sea wall to protect the small village because there usually was ice there to protect it from the storms that came through. The sea wall was built, millions of dollars in cost, and the first storm wiped it out

and they lost 100 feet of the island. This year, they lost 35 more feet, and they came within 35 feet of breaching the oil tanks that are on that island.

Climate change, issues in the arctic, it's time to have a discussion about this, folks. It's time to have a discussion about the national security implications, it's time to have a discussion about the issues regarding increased shipping, increased use of those waters for ecotourism, increased use of these waters for oil and natural gas development and exploration, increased use of these waters if there is a warm water path over the top of Russia or through the Northwest Passage that saves four to five thousand miles from a Panama Canal or Suez Canal transit. We need to understand there are important resources up there. The Red Dog Mine north of the Arctic Circle in Alaska is the largest zinc mine in the world. They now can ship 365 days a year. These are significant implications.

The current policy of the arctic was developed in 1994 in a presidential decision document. That discussion has been reopened. We are now taking a look at what our policy options are or could be in the arctic. For the Coast Guard, this couldn't come at a better time. We are facing significant challenges in our ability to provide presence up there. The Coast Guard assumed the icebreaking mission in this country from the U.S. Navy in the 1960s when they got out of the business. We've gone from a fleet of nearly 10 icebreakers down to 3, the *Polar Sea*, the *Polar Star* and the *Healy*. The *Healy* is new. The *Polar Sea* and the *Polar Star* are over 30 years old. The *Polar Sea* is operational, the *Polar Star* is in commission special status, laid up. It will take 18 months to put it back into service.

As we look at maritime strategy on a global basis, we can't ignore the future of the arctic, the implications of access to the arctic, national security issues, environmental issues, and energy issues associated with it. In the Coast Guard, we need to ask ourselves some serious questions. Where do we invest our money? How do we develop policies? Where are we going with our icebreaker fleet? And I would submit to you the answer is not to build new icebreakers, it probably is. The answer is to get the policy right, lock down the requirements, understand what forward presence, either through continual presence in the water or through forward operating

basis from which you can stage a response to in the arctic. How do they impact, support and extend our national policies for national security and so forth up there?

It is time to have the discussion, the discussion is under way, not only in the media and the press as you've seen, but inside the administration and in the Congress. As we move forward, we need to think about not only domestic governance as it relates to arctic policy, how do we knit together all the various roles and missions of the agencies that are involved up there? EPA, NOAA, Coast Guard, National Science Foundation? We need to think about international governing bodies as well, the Arctic Council. How do the international research structures and the four that are developed out there work together to build an international structure in the arctic?

In the Antarctic, there is an international treaty that governs what goes on there. There is no treaty in the arctic, so this is work to be done. I'm not saying we need a treaty, but we need to think about governance models and how we need to work internationally as well as domestically to move forward.

There are significant issues up there right now regarding development of continental shelf resources. Under the Law of the Sea Treaty, countries can claim continental shelf areas beyond the 200 mile exclusive economic zone based on providing empirical data to an international forum that then accepts that proposal. That is under way right now under the Law of the Sea. The U.S. government has equities up there as well off the north slope of Alaska. But I would tell you, this will be an incomplete process if the United States is not at the table.

The United States must ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty. We must become an international player, we must be at the table, we must have a say, not only for the equities that relate to the United States, but as a member of the international community and a member of the arctic community as well.

What I'd like to do today because my time is short, I would like to engage you in a conversation, so I'm going to finish my comments here very shortly and you can be thinking about some

questions. But as we move forward, inside the Coast Guard we will be looking at several things. Number one, what kind of requirements will we need to establish infrastructure to be able to forward operate off the north coast of Alaska? How do we work with our international partners? We have a tremendous relationship with Canada, the U.K. We have a three part search and rescue agreement that's already in place that we operate under now. We need to take a look at how that impacts catastrophic events in high latitudes. We have a very robust agreement and engagement with Canada on oil spill response. We need to figure out how that works in high latitudes as well.

We have talked in several international fora with our Russian counterparts. I think we need to consider at some point whether or not the Bering Strait needs a traffic separation scheme. With increased traffic, that will become an international choke point and we need to think right now about the safety, security, environmental impacts associated with increased traffic through the Straits. And we are prepared to have that discussion and ultimately have that discussion at IMO if necessary.

So as we move forward, there are significant equities, not only for the Coast Guard but for the United States and the world related to climate in the arctic. Now is the time to seize on the initiative to have the discussion. Now is the time to look for international coordinating mechanisms and establish governance models that can help us all develop whatever is going to go on in the arctic in terms of policy, presence and national interests in a way that benefits us all in a world that we all share together.

Arthur C. Clarke, the author of *Space Odyssey 2001*, once said, “If you looked at this planet from space, you would call it ocean.” And we are all crewmen, not passengers on this great planet that's traveling through space. It is time to have a discussion about arctic policy. And I'd be glad to take your questions. [applause] Yes, sir?

AUDIENCE: Eric McVadon, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. I'll be very quick and say that once in the arctic some decades ago, we were looking to do some special rescue missions way up near the Pole. I was in a P3, I thought I did something nobody else could do

and trying to accomplish this mission under awful weather conditions. And the next thing I knew, I had a C130 from the Coast Guard on my wing saying, “Yes, that looks pretty good.” So I will never forget that skill.

I wonder if you’d talk for a few minutes about what you're doing with the Chinese MSA, the cooperation between the Coast Guard and the Chinese agency.

ADMIRAL ALLEN: Actually, I’d really like to couch it a little larger term if I can. The United States Coast Guard is a member of something called the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum. That includes the United States, Canada, Russia, South Korea, Japan and China. As part of our engagement with these Coast Guard agencies, we expand that because in many case, all the things we do in the United States Coast Guard isn’t covered in a single agency or ministry with our international partners. And we usually need to be involved with the transportation ministries, any maritime safety agencies, public safety agencies, Coast Guard-like agencies.

In our work with the Chinese government, we have established a very, very significant bilateral relationship. We have a Coast Guard captain that is stationed in Beijing to carry out liaison for us. We have made trips to China to look at the international ship and port security safety codes. We have offered reciprocal visits. For several years in a row now, we have had cutters make port calls. The most recent one was the Coast Guard cutter *Boutwell* which was in Shanghai earlier this year. And as a result of that, we have embarked Chinese ship riders on our high seas drift net patrols out in the Pacific.

Our relationships with all of our partners and China are a very, very robust and a very strong one. We have other reasons to be involved with China. A lot of the international ship repair work is done in China now. Lot of the LNG construction is being done in South Korea and to the extent these vessels call into the United States or are subject to our port state control program, we need to be knowledgeable of how the shipbuilding industry in China is working and our relationship with them. And I will tell you, it’s a very strong, very robust, a very amiable relationship.

AUDIENCE: Do you feel its part of or stepping stones of global maritime partnerships?

ADMIRAL ALLEN: Everything is part of the global maritime partnership. When Mike Mullen talks about a thousand ship Navy, I would say maybe in Coast Guard he understands that, too. Because in some countries, you'll have a Navy and a Coast Guard under the Ministry of Defense. In other cases, you will have a Coast Guard under the Ministry of Interior. We can't discount any of those organizations and they really transcend the traditional MOD model, the Ministry of Defense model, where most of the engagement takes place. That's the reason that our partnership with the navy has never been more relevant.

That's the reason when the maritime strategy is signed, the CNO's name will be on it, General Conway's name will be on it, and my name will be on it. We need to multiply our effect on how all of us interact internationally. One there, and then there.

AUDIENCE: Jim Stark from the Spectrum Group. Could you comment on the recent Russian expedition that put a flag on the floor of the Arctic Ocean at the North Pole? Is that just a clever public relation stunt, or does it have any real impact on us?

ADMIRAL ALLEN: The only way under international law that I'm area of, and I'm not a lawyer and I didn't stay at a Holiday Inn Express last night [laughter], to my knowledge the way that you assert a claim over anything beyond the 200 mile limit, your exclusive economic zone, is to put the case forward under the U.N. Law of the Sea Commission, make your claim and have that claim accepted. You can do whatever you want, but in law and in practice, that's what you need to do.

AUDIENCE: Admiral Walt Doran, I'm a retired naval officer. I'm now with Raytheon. We've heard a number of times this week about the necessity to join the Law of the Sea conference and to ratify it. And it's kind of intuitive, I think, to most of us in the room. But so that we can take that argument out of here with a little bit more strength and power, what are we arguing against? I mean, what's the pushback? It used to be deep sea mining and manganese modules, but what exactly is the other side of the argument?

ADMIRAL ALLEN: Well, I think there was that argument, but through the 1980s, most of the objectionable portions of the treaty that we had were fixed. Now, there are enduring issues, making sure that you can insure freedom of navigation, and our defense forces need to be able to move unhindered. The Law of the Sea doesn't prohibit that. Doesn't prohibit it.

From a Coast Guard standpoint, there are some nations in the world that have claimed the 200 mile territorial sea. If we were concerned about migrant interdiction and drug interdiction, the ability to operate off these coasts in what would be legitimately international waters for the purposes of our national security goals and our law enforcement goals of this country, that gets very, very complicated.

When we challenge these countries on their territorial sea and we say we've only claimed a 12 mile territorial sea and a 12 mile contiguous zone consistent with the Law of the Sea, we have very little credibility when we say we've done it and we haven't ratified the treaty.

AUDIENCE: Thad, Meade Treadwell, the U.S. Arctic Research Commission. First thing I'd like to do is thank you and commend you for your leadership on the arctic policy and your remarks today, I thought they were very well done, and we're working with you on that. Second question is in this conference, we've seen a number of different regional agreements on maritime cooperation. And you mentioned your work with Canada and the U.K. in the arctic. Do you see as coming out of this policy maybe a call for a joint maritime force in the north?

ADMIRAL ALLEN: That may happen some day. I think in the meantime, we need to take a look at getting together and talking and having a dialogue. We were so buoyed with the success we've had with the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum which went into its eighth year, Russia hosted this year, just three weeks ago in St. Petersburg, and I was there, we will host next year in San Francisco. We have been successful working with our partners in the Atlantic. And later on in October, we will have the first ever North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum hosted by Sweden to be followed next year by hosting by Iceland.

We think because of the players that will be involved there, which will include Russia and Canada as well because of the coasts they have, that is a perfect forum for us to start talking about Coast Guard issues related to the arctic. So issues like icebreaking, environmental response, search and rescue response, and so forth, we think this is a perfect venue to do that. It allows us to meet in a plenary session and talk about issues together, issue a statement at the end. But it also allows us to have bilateral meetings with the individual countries and we are already setting up agendas of how we're going to do that.

I opined to George DuPont who is my Canadian counterpart, the Canadian Coast Guard, that it might be nice—One could envision five to ten years from now the development of regional coordinating mechanisms because regions are different and specific and unique. And I think what I would like to see is the emergence of regional, low barriers to entry governance constructs where everybody can work together at a regional level to achieve the goals they all agree to. In other words, the Indian Ocean is a far different place than the Bering Sea. But you can make a case, they need a Coast Guard-like forum there even though we wouldn't be involved in it to coordinate the multinational issues that are there.

And I told George when we were in St. Petersburg, George DuPont, that wouldn't it be wonderful if five to ten years from now if we could have a world congress of Coast Guard forums? But right now, there's a little bit of asymmetry of where we're organized and where we're not. But I think certainly, given the resource issues associated with the oceans and security implications, the transportation implications, that this is a construct that works. The North Pacific Coast Guard Forum is a very low barrier to entry, low overhead organization.

Here's how it works, folks. If you're going to host the meeting the following year, you're the executive secretariat. That's it. [laughter] That's it. And we have a subject matter experts meeting six months before the forum to lock down the agenda, and then we have work groups that are set up, led by each country and law enforcement, illegal migration, drug trafficking, emergency response and so forth. We get together and in the North Pacific, at least, we're going to move to an annual schedule, a multi-mission, multilateral exercises that will be rotated among the countries three years after they host the event in their country. You got to make it value

added, low barriers to entry, open communications, and mindful that everybody has different budgeting processes and you need to plan out several years in advance for exercises.

AUDIENCE: Admiral Allen, my name is Eric Labs, I work for the Congressional Budget Office. I was wondering if you could take a moment to elaborate about why a national icebreaking capability is in our national interests. Why that, and what sort of would be the approximate cost for replacing and improving or improving that icebreaking capability would be. All too often in my interactions up on Capitol Hill, you mention icebreakers and eyes sort of glaze over and it's kind of the "so what?" and I'm not sure how much of that story has been told very well.

ADMIRAL ALLEN: Well, it's a great question. Let me go back and make sure I repeat what I said earlier, because it's very, very important. Each time we walk into a room in this town, our credibility tends to be impeached, the Coast Guard's credibility, because the perception is we just want new icebreakers. Icebreakers are probably the solution, but they can't go ahead of a policy construct and the development of requirements that provide capabilities that meet national needs. That's the reason it's going to be so important to align what we want to do domestically and internationally because that will drive us. There are a lot of ways you can create presence in the arctic: forward operating bases, and we need to understand what kind of presence do we want? Do we want the ability to operate from there, or do you want to have the ability to be there? And when do we want to be there?

And a lot of that is driven by the changes in vessel traffic, which is big studies going on right now, changes in the environment and so forth. I don't think there's going to be any question that we need some kind of icebreaking capability because even when ice breaks loose and floats in a pack, it presents significant problems. Or how do you do an oil spill response in and around ice without icebreaking capability? So inherently, I think there's a reason to take a look at it, but I'm not going to put the cart before the horse here. What we really want to drive is a policy discussion and develops national requirements and international consensus of how we need to move forward with governing structures first.

AUDIENCE: Commander Klivan, the Joint Staff. On the heels of that last comment, sir, can you comment on the collaboration from the maritime services great initiative? Do you see that same kind of momentum going at the secretariat level and developing a national strategy? And what comes to mind is the ongoing crafting of the National Defense Strategy of the Secretary of Defense. Do you see that same kind of effort going into that document?

ADMIRAL ALLEN: I think we do, because you need both vertical and horizontal integration and alignment. You can't make these policy documents in a vacuum. I put out a Coast Guard strategy document back in February, but the development of the maritime strategy document is integrated and they understand each other exist, and some things already preexist. What you want is a framework, a family of plans if you will, that reinforces each other, but also focuses on the national goals you're trying to achieve.

As it relates to the arctic, we've gotten very good support. All the meetings that I attend, the National Security Council and so forth, we have both OSD and the J5 representation.

AUDIENCE: Admiral, I'm Cecil Haney serving in Group 2. We hear a lot here during this conference about maritime domain awareness. We've also heard a bunch of comments from also those in the shipping industry. And it seems to me there's a tug of war of how you adequately are able to monitor the vast amount of shipping that comes into the country without stagnating economic growth and viability. I'd like your comments on that, sir.

ADMIRAL ALLEN: That's a great question. First of all, maritime domain awareness is only a part of three things that are needed in what we would call a governance structure for what is arguably the last global commons. You need to understand the legal regimes and the structures that are out there, and that's a combination of domestic legislation, international treaties, agreements and so forth, what creates a legal status for what goes on out there.

The second is once you understand that, you need to be aware of what's going on so if there's a threat, you can sense and act. That is the maritime domain awareness. And the third is

operational capability to be able to act. And that's kind of how we framed the notion of governance and what I said is arguably the last global commons.

The way ahead, really, on the commercial side, is through ship tracking. And we're doing that in two steps right now. The first is through automated identification systems, which were originally evolved as a safety mechanism for ships that were in line of sight of each other, would know each other's position for collision avoidance. That technology has matured now and now there are mandatory carriage requirements for all vessels greater than 300 gross tons to carry this, and this has been worked through the International Maritime Organization. That is not enough because that is line of sight. It's not the right technology to give you the kind of persistent, comprehensive surveillance that you need.

We have recently negotiated successfully at IMO an international agreement for long range tracking. It would go to the larger issue of the approaches, and these are being done in one thousand and two thousand mile bands, whether or not you intend to enter a state or you're in transit. If you declared your intent to enter a coastal state, then you will have to have a long range tracking device available that can be identified 2,000 miles out. These are devices that automatically transmit information about the vessel and its position, not unlike transponders on airplanes that are key to the safety of the air transportation system. The question is putting the infrastructure in place that can receive this information and broadcast it back out and make it available to the mariner.

Right now, we are trying to develop systems to collect AIS information and to re-broadcast that out to whomever needs it. Probably the most successful operation going on right now is with the NATO standing forces and their presence since 9/11 in and around Gibraltar where they collect AIS information from the receivers on the ships and then they transmit that back out to all the nations that are partners with them. They also take that AIS information and they compare it to open data sources like Lloyd's list. And believe it or not, just from having that information on the open data sources, they detect anomalies. And when they do that, they refer it to the port of destination for that country to act on when they arrive.

So I think the pieces are there. And when we talk about maritime domain awareness, it's being able to identify threats. In the past, anonymity has been the hallmark of people who use the oceans. There are proprietary advantages to being anonymous. Where you're fishing, where that tanker was with oil vis-à-vis the spot market. No matter what you're involved in, there's a certain amount of anonymity, was what you sought. We're trying to change the paradigm. The more we make this transparent and we know who's legitimate, we will know who's not legitimate. How we can separate from the legitimate conveyances from what we really need to look at and be able to make that sort problem less. But that's where we're going.

AUDIENCE: Admiral Allen, a question and a comment. I'm sure it hasn't escaped your notice that after Admiral Mullen traveled to Russia, the CNO was changed in Russia, and so I hope your counterpart is still in place in St. Petersburg. [laughter]

ADMIRAL ALLEN: He is.

AUDIENCE: The question I wanted to ask—

ADMIRAL ALLEN: It's General Pronachev (?).

AUDIENCE: The question I wanted to ask you concerns the engagement that U.S. Coast Guard has with foreign navies. A large part of this conference talked about theater security cooperation, phase zero planning. And I know the Coast Guard does a great deal of this. A lot of the burden falls upon the Coast Guard because of the size of navies around the world. How do you within the Coast Guard prioritize countries and/or co-COMs in terms of taskings (sic) for yearly or biannual events? And with the AFRICOM, will that complicate your resource tasking in coming years?

ADMIRAL ALLEN: That's a really good question. When we look at our international engagement writ large for the entire Coast Guard, we understand a couple of things. Number one, we have separate equities related to the missions we own in the Coast Guard that make certain regions and countries more consequential to us than, say, maybe the Navy or anybody

else based on just our mission set. But we also know we have the competencies, the capability and some capacity to be used for theater security cooperation for the co-COMs and we are over-subscribed. It's not a matter of not having the competency, it's a matter of how much we can do. So therefore, we have to prioritize not only what we think we need to do for the Coast Guard, but what we need to do internationally.

And then the third piece is there may be a crying need and that particular country may want our type of capability, but then there's a funding piece and all the governance structures that go together with putting that type of capability into train a country. And that gets us back to working with not only the combatant commanders, but with the State Department as well.

The final piece that makes this somewhat difficult is some of the people that need our help, again, don't work for the Ministry of Defense. So some of the current authorizing legislation and funding mechanisms fail to allow us to put the ammunition on target, if you will, to be able to put the training team in that particular country because the country may be requesting it for their Coast Guard, but the Coast Guard works for the Ministry of the Interior and there's no ready mechanism by which to do that.

Now, there is authorizing legislation on the Hill this year on the part of the Defense Department to expand their capability to use those 1206 funds, is what they call it. We support that, and we've actually sought some legislation in the Coast Guard authorizing bill to allow us to be able to do that. Doesn't necessarily fund it, but we're not constrained by legislation when we need to do it.

We're pretty close to being on time. Anybody else? I'll let you enjoy the rest of your lunch. Thank you, folks. [applause]

DR. PFALTZGRAFF: On our collective behalf, we thank you Admiral Allen for taking the time to be with us and for giving us complete answers to some very important questions and surveying the landscape for us. So again, many thanks for being with us. We wish you the very best. [applause]

ADMIRAL ALLEN: Thank you.

DR. PFALTZGRAFF: We now have a few minutes to finish lunch and also most of the panel that was the international panel is still with us. So if you have questions for them [laughter] , this is a time to do that. So I don't know how we would proceed here, but they're here informally if you want to talk to them. I'm sure they'll answer your questions.

We should be prepared to reassemble promptly at two p.m. for the concluding session which begins back where we have come from. So enjoy the rest of your lunch now.