National Stategies and Capabilities
for a Changing World

Panel 5: Essential Military Capabilities for a Changing World

Moderator:

Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis, Executive Vice President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and President, National Security Planning Associates, Inc.

Panel Members:

Admiral (Retired) Hal Gehman, former Commander-in-Chief, US Joint Forces Command

General Charles T. Robertson, USAF, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Transportation Command

General Tommy R. Franks, USA, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command

General Peter Pace, USMC, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command

General Charles R. Holland, USAF, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command

Dr. Davis: Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to this morning's first presentation on Essential Military Capabilities for a New Era. Traditionally, the art of diplomacy has been the hallmark of a nation's foreign engagement, with military force used to support that engagement and to protect national interests, however they are defined. In recent years, however, nations have placed a greater burden on their militaries. In some instances looking to them to resolve difficult and complex foreign policy problems. Sometimes military forces have been employed within the framework of a broader, national strategy. Other times they have been used without a clear strategy in place and this has contributed to widespread debate over the role of force in international relations, as well as to concern over the use of the military for so-called nontraditional mission taskings.

Just how we in the United States choose to use our military forces has implications for force structure and strength and a host of personnel considerations, not to mention operational planning, rules of engagement and force protection. The men sitting at this table today are regional or functional Commanders in Chief. CINCs are among those to whom we look for guidance when the national command authority is considering the employment of American military forces.

From their experiences as operational planners and military leaders, their views on these issues and the challenges confronting the employment of U.S. military forces must be regarded as essential to the decision process of any administration.
Two of our panel members, Generals Franks and Pace are regional CINCs whose areas of responsibility, AORs comprise, in the case of General Franks, United States Central Command which includes one of the two principle foci of the Defense Department's 2 MTW construct. And in the case of General Pace and U.S. Southern Command, our neighbors to the south, in Central and Latin America and the Caribbean basin.

Generals Robertson and Holland, respectively, command TRANSCOM and SOCOM, U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Special Operations Command, both of which are functional commands embracing support requirements for the regional CINCs, the Joint Staff, and the Department of Defense, more generally.

Admiral Gehman, who also joins us today on our panel, as you well know, recently retired from command of U.S. ACOM (Atlantic Command) which was re-designated as the U.S. Joint Forces Command. JFCOM is a functional and a regional command tasked with supporting the Department of Defense (DOD) in its consequence management missions, as well as the regional CINCs in overseas contingency planning. The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) is also the CINC of Joint Forces Command and therefore is the chief advocate for interoperability and the Department of Defense's executive agent for joint experimentation. Under his SACLANT hat, the CINC has coalition planning responsibilities as one of NATO's two strategic commands. Since his retirement, Admiral Gehman has been appointed to co-chair with General Bill Crouch a DOD commission on assessing lessons learned from the attack on the U.S.S. Cole.

We are privileged to have each of you with us today, and we look forward to hearing your views of some of the key questions that are facing military planners, the new administration, and Congress as the United States steps up to the challenges of its world role. I just want to mention that most of you might have noticed that General Tommy Schwartz was supposed to be on our panel today. Unfortunately, he's still recovering from some minor surgery at Walter Reed and is unable to join us. But I know he's here with us in spirit, and General Franks assures me he can answer any questions on Korea that might be posed. [Laughter]

To facilitate our discussion, and to make the most efficient use of time of these gentlemen who have very busy schedules, this panel will proceed according to its own unique format. It will be based on a question and answer approach similar perhaps to one of the presidential debates in which Jim Lehrer posed a number of questions to the two candidates. Accordingly, as I am Jim Lehrer for you today, I have divided the questions into three broad categories. They correspond to questions about structures and processes, operational issues, and strategic considerations. At the end of our time, if the CINCs have answered all of the questions and there is time remaining, I will open the floor to the audience for you to ask questions directly to the CINCs.

In beginning with questions about structures and processes, I think the first question that might be appropriate for all the CINCs to address is a question related to the Unified Command Plan. From your perspective, should the Unified Command Plan be changed? As issues increasingly transcend the Areas of Responsibility (AORs) of regional CINCs and global challenges including cyber crime and terrorism, about which we heard a great deal yesterday, appear more likely, how can we assure that U.S. strategic interests are not sacrificed for parochial, regional concerns? Gentlemen, let's start with Admiral Gehman first.

Admiral Gehman: As most people in the audience realize, the Unified Command Plan, a document signed by the President which sets down the rules by which all of us operate, is reviewed automatically every two years. It's reviewed every odd year so next year there will be a review of the Unified Command Plan automatically. Coinciding, interestingly enough, with the Quadrennial Defense Review. Interesting, so if you can't fix something in Quadrennial Defense Review, maybe you can fix it in the UCP.

The UCP changes are evolutionary, properly so. We don't need any big, dramatic changes. To answer your question though, specifically, what I'm looking for this year, it's my personal opinion that we have enough CINCs. We have nine CINCs. And I think that's enough. By that I mean when you think about CINCs, you got to remember that you're talking about big staffs, headquarters, intelligence commands, and I think nine's enough. Now the question is how do we redistribute the workload, post Cold War workload among those nine officers? That's one thing that I know the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will look at. There are some things Dr. Davis mentioned like the new information, the new capabilities of information warfare and things like that. So all that'll be done. But I don't— I would oppose any new CINCs. We have some new missions, but I would recommend that we find a way to redistribute them. As a taxpayer, I object to creating any more CINCs.

The second area that I think the Unified Command is going to look at, of course, is the role of the CINCs in requirements determination process. Right now all CINCs have requirements, all CINCs can input those requirements into the system. But really only one or two CINCs pay a lot of attention to requirements, Joint Forces Command being one of them. And that process may need to be reinforced, and I think that's a proper thing for us to look at. And with that, I'll pass it on to another CINC.

Dr. Davis: General Robertson?

General Robertson: I have a different but similar view as Admiral Gehman coming from a functional CINC perspective. I've always viewed the Unified Command Plan as a strategic perspective on CINCs' roles and missions as opposed to a tactical perspective on CINCs' roles and missions. And as the world, in my view, has always been that as the world continues to evolve, as AORs rise and fall in their importance to U.S. national security, as countries rise and fall in importance to U.S. national security, as ways of approaching the mission due to technology advances or modernization, weapon systems, or capabilities of people evolve, so should plans. And plans, just in the same way the Unified Command Plan, needs to evolve. But it needs to evolve from that strategic perspective and not from a tactical perspective. And that's why the wisdom of the CINCs and the Chairman and all the wisdom that we can gather in the Department of Defense is essential that as we look at these biennial transformations of the Unified Command Plan that we apply that strategic longer-range view so that we don't get captured by the expediency of the moment.

But it should change. It should evolve. Even in my own area, as a functional CINC responsible for transportation, as global methods of transportation and logistics evolve, and the commercial market becomes much more efficient and effective in the way they do business, we will do the same thing. And we need to look at the roles and missions of U.S. Transportation Command in the UCP. So yes, Jackie, I believe definitely that the UCP needs to evolve as the world evolves.

Dr. Davis: We have heard now from a regional and a functional CINC and a regional and a functional CINC in the case of U.S. Joint Forces Command. I wonder if we can move on to a related question and General Franks, General Pace, General Holland, certainly feel free to address the issue of the UCP. But what should be the role of the CINCs in the inter-agency decision process and how can you as a CINC insure that operational decisions support not only the national military strategy, but America's long term strategic interests and objectives? General Franks?

General Franks: Thanks, Jackie. I think that it's possible to tie the previous question into this one. The Unified Command Plan, in fact, has remained dynamic so that it embraces the reality of the world in which we live rather than in too many cases the world in which we'd like to live.

It occurred to me as I was thinking about coming up to this conference that there exists globally today a continuum of complex relationships between governments, some bilateral, some multilateral. But if you can have the vision of a continuum where perhaps on one end you would have a conflict and then a bit less direct than conflict, perhaps crisis, and then if you move a bit to the right of crisis, perhaps coexistence. And then if you move a bit to the right of that perhaps cooperation and then at some point collaboration and perhaps coalition.

It seems to me that in this context, and given these sorts of relationships, what is necessary is for us to dynamically review this, whether it is UCP, whether it is security strategy, whether it is our national military strategy on a continuing basis so that we can take into account the relationships we in fact have in these various regions. And in my case, you can find on any given day some nations which are in conflict.

Additionally, you can find some which are in crisis. You can find some nations in the central region which co-exist. There are also some who cooperate with one another. And so it seems to me that the most important ingredients in our relationships within our own government, the inter-agency, our approaches between the Security Council, the Joint Staff, OSD, the State Department, and so forth, as long as we remain tuned in to this continuum that I've described, then I think we probably evolve correctly regionally over time. And I don't have a big complaint about the way that's being done today.

Dr. Davis: General Pace?

General Pace: Thanks, Jackie. I am very comfortable with both the UCP process and with the inter-agency process. The UCP, as already been mentioned, is very much an evolutionary process. It is designed to help focus us strategically. As you look at the world's trade, for example, about 25 percent of the trade the U.S. conducts is east-west with Europe. About 25 percent is east-west with Asia, and about 50 percent is north-south inside this hemisphere. So as I look to the future, and when I have my opportunity to participate in a process this year, I will be looking to make comments along the lines of, if in fact half of our trade is north-south and when we go to meetings like we did recently in Manous where the Secretary of Defense was representing our country and all the other countries in the hemisphere were represented to include Mexico and Canada, there was certainly from a military perspective a reason to have perhaps tie the links militarily with Mexico and Canada as part of the UCP process for southern command. But there are other agencies in the government that must weigh in on that because the military piece is a small part. But that's why the discussion is so important.

Likewise with the inter-agency process, when it comes to taking military action, I'm very comfortable that when there are things in my area of operations that are going to be taken, that I will have the opportunity to prepare the plans, I will be able through the Chairman and the Joint Staff to have those plans represented to the national command authorities, and that the inter-agency process here, the Principles Committee, the Deputy's Committee, and all the meetings that take place in Washington will give my views in the proper venue. So I'm very comfortable with that process.

Dr. Davis: General Holland?

General Holland: Thank you, Jackie. I think as I look at your theme for the conference and I see the words "for a changing world" I think the only certainty we have is the fact that our world is changing. I think what's important, and already the Chairman has laid that out, is that we do review the process. I think that's important because there is no status quo. I don't think there's any of us in here that could have predicted what has happened in the last 10 or 15 years. So the only certainty is that there will be change.

And one thing in the special ops command, we talk about, you know training to certainty but educate for uncertainty. And truly we are in an uncertain world that continues to change. And so as we looked at the plans, we need to continue to go back, re-look, take a look. Have the threats changed, or our interests changed? Then we need to be adaptable to that. And as a functional CINC, I really get my lead from the regional CINCs. Because our reason for being in special operations command is to make sure that between Pete Pace and Tommy Franks and the other CINCs that they have our resources to do what they need to do. And maybe that might be laid out in a thinner engagement plan. It might be something that comes, you know, through the State Department ambassadors, but I see that as our very important role.

When we talk about the inter-agency process, there's a Presidential decision there that— The directive decision in 56. I think that is a starting point. All the operations that we find ourselves involved with no longer is it unilateral, no longer is it just joint. It's usually combined, it's joint, it's inter-agency. And we need to make sure that each of us bring to the table those capabilities that we can best employ and then play to the strengths of those agencies and bring that all part of the overall solution.

And to me it's very encouraging as I look out among the crowd here today to see all of our coalition partners because definitely the world as we see in the future is going to take all of us working together as a team, teams, to come up with that final solution.
Dr. Davis: General Holland, a follow on question if I might. Should traditional military occupation specialties, MOS's be transformed and new emphasis placed on different skill sets and mission essential task lists, and what does this mean for our force providers?

General Holland: Definitely a good follow on question because when you take a look at the skill sets, and I can flash back, you know, 30 years ago, you know, flying gun ships and the type of skills I needed at that time, and you take a look at our tactics, techniques, and procedures, and then you look at today's world as how we've evolved with information operations, the computer age, I usually make a statement and oftentimes have given speeches. My background is an engineer, aeronautical and astronautical. And in those days I had a K and E slide rule, and I look at my son today, and he wonders, "Dad, what is that?" And I take a look at the computer technology and I look at what happens in our weapon systems, and there's technology throughout.

And so the skill set of our people today, we need to make sure that the training, that they understand how to exploit that technology. Because technology, unless we can exploit it for that soldier, sailor, airman, marine that's out there at the forward edge of the battle, and it's like a rock in a rucksack. It does not do us any good. And so we've got to make sure that we continue to update our skills. We've got to make sure that we provide the requisite training with the increased technology that's coming forward. And then with that, then we can meet our mission needs.

Dr. Davis: Admiral Gehman, of course that's a natural question for you as well.

Admiral Gehman: Well, of course our personnel and our skills and technical capabilities have to evolve with the world in which we find ourselves. But I gathered that the thrust behind your question was whether or not we need different MOS's because the roles and missions of the armed forces seem to be changing due to the kinds of tasks that we're finding around the world. And to that part of the question, I would say no. I think the Chairman said it— It was said last night by one or two of the service chiefs, and I think that we all— Most of us in uniform really do believe the old axiom that good soldiers make good peacekeepers, but not the other way around.

So if I understood your question right, no, I do not believe that the kind of tasks we find our armed forces actually performing lead us to a conclusion that we should develop a new MOS set.

Dr. Davis: General Franks, you may answer for yourself or General Schwartz, whichever is easiest. Should the two major theater of war construct— We had a great discussion of this last night at dinner. I think the general consensus was it's not a strategy, should the two major theater of war construct remain the yardstick for U.S. military planning? Or should we instead emphasize a less tailored approach to force structure development perhaps emphasizing the capabilities based assessment as the basis for service structuring and joint and combined planning?

General Franks: I'd be more comfortable answering this as General Schwartz. [Laughter] I think if you look at the relationship between security strategy and military strategy, engagement approaches, prioritized regional objectives, and so forth, you can find the foundation for what we have now, which is a strategy that addresses two major theaters of war.

I think it's important to remember that that strategy was not arrived at capriciously and it didn't have a lot to do with capabilities. It had to do with our assessment of what the world looked like at the point in time when we arrived at the strategy.
Without being circuitous or cute about it, I guess I would say, Jackie, that if we assess that it is in our national vital interest to be able to engage in two major theaters of war simultaneously, then that would remain a construct that we'd review over the future. I believe that there is a serious flaw involved in trying to structure, equip, man, and sustain forces in accordance with what we think we can afford rather than in accordance with what we think we need. And so I probably would leave it about that way.

If the sense is that because of our national interests, as they are articulated in the strategy documents that I described, we need to be able to address two major theaters of war—as well as a variety of conflicts and shaping activities and so forth in the future—then it would be against that sort of strategy that the services would perform their responsibilities. If on the other hand we believe that the world is a place that does not threaten our national interests to a level of two major theaters near simultaneously, then an alternative strategy would be appropriate. And that's my view.

Dr. Davis: General Robertson, as a force provider and a functional CINC, what are your views on the 2 MTW issue?
General Robertson: Well, I do have a different view as a force provider, but it's only a little different. I agree with General Schwartz here that we need to make an assessment as a nation what our national interests are. And then develop the strategy to meet that.

At the same time, as the one who is primarily responsible for delivering the forces, sustaining the forces, and bringing the forces home who are— Who we charge with leading that fight, whether the fight be an actual fight, or whether it just be a humanitarian response, my concern is that once we decide, once that's— Once we decide what that strategy is to be, that it be quantifiable enough that we can fund the Department of Defense and the services adequately to meet that strategy. And I have a— I mean, it is a particular concern to me because right now with the current two major theater war strategy, two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, because those two words are also very near and dear to me, I am only funded and resourced with a one major theater war transportation force. And that's why the nearly simultaneous is there, because I deliver the one, and then I have to have time to move and deliver the other in the other direction.

If we change the strategy I am still only funded to a one major theater war force. The other thing that I would caution as we go into this quadrennial defense review and strategy assessment process, is that we not make unrealistic assumptions about what the force providers can provide and when they can provide it. We don't automatically assume that if a major theater war kicks of in region A that you're going to stop everything you're doing in region B, C and D, everything you're doing in B, C and D and divert all your resources to region A. The world doesn't work that way, and we need to make sure that the military is adequately resourced to meet whatever strategy we come up with.

Dr. Davis: Thank you. General Pace, as a CINC, what do you think of the proposal that was mentioned during the presidential campaign to leapfrog a generation of technology and focus on an acquisition strategy that places emphasis on transformational technologies or platforms such as, for example, all electric drive ships, the SSGN platform, or the Army's future combat system?

General Pace: The question I think goes back to a question that was asked from the audience this morning of General Shelton. And the question that was asked of him, very similar, which is do we accept more risk today for readiness for tomorrow's readiness. The answer I would give about accepting more risk today on readiness is absolutely not. We owe the moms and dads of this country who have lent us their sons and daughters the best capability, best prepared military we possibly can. When ask these soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines to go into combat, they must be absolutely ready. And it's my responsibility to make sure that anything happens in my area, that the troops we send in are properly prepared.

So we're not talking about accepting risk on today's readiness. Nor are we talking about accepting risk in tomorrow's readiness because the same logic will hold true tomorrow as it does today. I think the correct question is really will we accept risk and capability? Do we need an incremental change in capability that might cost X billion dollars, or might we take the risk that the leap ahead in technology might not work. But if it does, instead of being four times faster than today, it'll be ten times faster? And I think we can accept some risk in bringing new technology and yet unproven technology to bear.

If we accept the fact, and everything I've heard so far from all my other counterparts and not in this panel, but so far in the conference, is that we do accept, at least for the foreseeable future, we do not have a peer competitor. If we do not have a peer competitor, that means that today's equipment properly maintained is going to be sufficient to handle any known or foreseeable threat. If that's true, then let's not buy the incremental. Let's go to the leap ahead technology that will in fact maintain our superiority and accept the risk that's involved in perhaps missing a capability. If you miss the capability, then you end up back where you are today, and where you are today is no peer competitor.

Dr. Davis: You're not suggesting canceling the F18 or the F22 programs to fund the JSF are you?

General Pace: No, I'm not.

Dr. Davis: I wouldn't put words in your mouth. [Laughter] General Holland?

General Holland: No, I think General Pace hit that exactly right on. The thing is, when you jump ahead, the leap ahead technology, you've got to have a bridge to be able to get to that endeavor. But there's another thing that's very sobering, and it's just the length of time that it takes from the idea where you need to have that capability— From the time the capability you need and the time you filled it. And I'll flashback to 25 April 1980 when Jim Valk was the Commander of Desert I. Out of that Desert I rescue attempt was borne the MC 130 combat Talon II. We did not field the system with initial operation capability until 1993. So Jim and the people that were there for that operation, they realized we needed that type of capability and so you have that length of time that it takes to bring that on.

And of course during that time, who predicted the fall of the Wall, the Desert Storm, and all the things that took place, you know, during that time? So who can be predictive with what the future looks like. So as you look— The caution is, exactly what the Chairman was talking about, is this risk. And also, I think the other point they made last night was the one that General Ryan talked about. When he talked about the average age of aircraft systems today is 22 years old, in 15 years it's going to be 30 years old, and I know that Tony Robertson from an airlift perspective can talk about, you know, the iron that's out there on the runways today and how old it's getting.

And so if you go to that leap ahead, we've got to make sure we have a bridge to get us there. And in special ops command, we are trying to do a leap ahead, but we're also going to make sure that we maintain that bridge and it's got to be very relevant to the types of threats that General Pace talked about, in whichever theater we're involved with.

Dr. Davis: Thank you. Admiral Gehman?

Admiral Gehman: I believe— I think that General Holland's example of the Desert I example is illustrative. Dr. Davis' question should not be viewed as an either/or question. And that question gets asked a lot in that context. Modernization or re-capitalization or modernization and readiness today. And I suggest that we should not ever answer that question in the either/or context. It's more complicated than that. And the Desert I example is very illustrative of where a field commander, an operational commander identified a pressing need for an essentially a modification to an existing helicopter and then 13 years later that need was met.

That's illustrative of some improvements or some process improvements in which we can— We can modernize, we can transform, we can adopt leap ahead technology. And at the same time keep our readiness up. Now, it does involve some different ways of looking at the equation. For example, it's true that you cannot buy everything for everybody and you cannot do a one for one replacement. You cannot replace every single tactical aircraft with an F22. There's just not enough money in the whole U.S. government to do that. You cannot replace $265 million Kitty Hawk with a $5 billion— You can't do that.

So some place in between, this is fungible, and a new way of looking at how you do that bridge is probably the way we need to go. I am particularly struck, to give you an anecdotal story which is similar to the Desert I story. In a joint forces command, one of our many, many things that we're working on very hard is fratricide, combat ID problem. We've been working on it for a long time. And we've looked at a lot of technologies, and we've looked at a lot of processes and a lot of tactics, techniques, and procedures. And we've gathered a lot of data.

And one of the areas which we think is very interesting and should be pursued better is for U.S. forces to have better situational awareness. That is, if we know where each other is much, much better, we probably will cut down on the fratricide. But a side benefit of this study about situational awareness has lead to some statistics that I've looked at that indicates that on average, American armed forces, all American armed forces, from the infantrymen firing his rifle to an air to air engagement, to a surface to air engagement with Patriots or ships, to an air to surface engagement with standoff weapons, it doesn't make any difference. On average, Americans fire their weapon systems at one-third of the kinetic range of the weapon. Why? Because we don't know who we're shooting at. We bore on in close to make sure we got the target right. So if you could improve the situational awareness, you could do a 2X or some X improvement of the present weapon systems.

This morning the Chairman talked about interoperability and the joint force core competency. These are all ways to increase our war fighting capability, mitigate the risk, build the bridge and still modernize for the future. So I suggest we need to avoid this either/or kind of approach and fund some of these things which fix immediate problems and allow us to hold down the risk to our own forces while at the same we modernize them.

Dr. Davis: Thank you, Admiral Gehman. Moving on to operational issues, General Franks, unity of command is a sacred military concept. In today's world, however, U.S. alliance and coalition partner relationships are complex, and operational control is often subject to contentious political debate. To what extent should U.S. military planning be predicated on combined planning and how important is interoperability in your AOR for contingency planning?

General Franks: Let me begin at the end. Interoperability in an environment where in some cases we will operate based on bilateral relationships and in other cases will operate based on complex, multilateral relationships, is awfully important. I think that it behooves all of us to deal, however, in the real world. In our region, there is no NATO and as a result of there not being a NATO, there is not a convenient set of Standardization Agreements (STANAGs), and so what that implies is day to day, 24/7, 365 day a year engagement with military formations of our friends and our partners and our region to be sure that we build the very best cooperating capability, collaborating capability with each of these armed forces.

And depending on the plan and depending on the level of activity that we may have with each one of these states, we'll see different levels of complexity. We will see different levels of capability. I am back to the original notion of this sort of continuum of complex relationships. They exist state to state, and those relationships also exist between the militaries. It is my view that tomorrow's fight will certainly be joint. It will probably be combined or coalition, depending on the degree of depth of cooperation between the nations involved. And so in view of that kind of dynamic world, we need to be a better business every day working to build the coalitions, working to move along a continuum from coexistence to cooperation and from collaboration to coalition.

Dr. Davis: General Pace?

General Pace: I agree with what General Franks just said. I was struck recently in one of the countries in South America. I was visiting my counterpart, and he said something to me that really struck me. He said, "You know, no country is so strong as to be able to do it by itself. And no country is so weak as to not be able to contribute." And that really struck me as a very profound statement.

And what he was telling me was we understand the various strengths and weaknesses of the nations, but from his perspective, what he was doing was reaching out within his region and reaching out within the hemisphere to find ways to collaborate and combine the capabilities. So from the standpoint of what General Franks said, certainly the U.S. approach will be joint and most likely will be combined. We must have that interoperability to make that function properly, not only within ourselves, but to be able to reach out to our partners.

I think the reach out to the partners piece is really very difficult, but I think technology can help us. We don't necessarily all have to have the exact same kind of equipment. If we have some technologies that will bridge the gap for us. So I think that is the wave of the future, and certainly my area of operation, the folks I'm working with are, number one, very much in tune with regional cooperation, which they are showing daily. And also in finding better ways to partner with us.
Dr. Davis: I'd like to ask the next question of all of our CINCs. As regional CINCs and force providers, what are the greatest challenges that you perceive as you look out on the first decade of the 21st century? And where do you see new opportunities for addressing these issues? General Holland?

General Holland: Well, as you well know there are definitely a lot of challenges on the road ahead. The one piece I'd like to go back to maybe somebody— First question that was asked. We talked about do we have enough to do, what at hand, we have to do today. The readiness piece. And the way I look at it, I use a kind of phrase, RPM. You know, RPM is kind of a health of an engine, but it's also the health of an organization because you got readiness people and modernization. And that readiness piece and our ability to support the theater CINCs, there's a lot of times that we come up with a shortage in certain areas.

And that's that low-density, high demand areas. And one area as an example is civil affairs. As we take a look at the world situation, our civil affairs, we need more than what awe have today. And as a result of that is we went back to the review process, we added five reserve battalions and 1,100 people to kind of help solve that. So you know, that is something that we need to continue to look at as the situation changes.

All of you know in this world of terrorism, that has changed. The persons and the different factions that we're working against today are very dedicated, they're committed, they believe in their cause, and we cannot look at this from the standpoint the way we've looked at it in the past. And this commitment, and as you saw just recently with the U.S.S. Cole, I was at our crisis action team meeting in Ramstein, Germany on 12 October when that happened. And you look at this committed individual, and what that committed individual can do against our resources so that is something we need to continue to look at as we get into the future.

The information operations, I mean, this world of ours is shrinking. The concern that we have from the special operations viewpoint is that normally we are forward. We're forward in doing the coalition building that was previously discussed and trying to develop those relationships with other countries because I do agree wholeheartedly with you. Because as I've traveled around, every country can make a contribution. Every country wants to make their contribution, no matter how big or how small. And if we can bring all that together, then we'll be a lot more successful.

I think Sun Tzu said it best, "I'd like to have more friends than enemies." And by working together as a coalition, you know, we can do that. But as the would continues to shrink and the information operations, the surprise that we were able to maintain in the past is something that's going to have to be looked at in the future. We always talk about the success of an operations. If you can stay inside the decision cycle of the enemy, but if the enemy is passing information and information passes a lot faster than planes can fly to in fill our teams, then that is a dilemma that we need to face.

And of course, the last one which is most primary, is the weapons of mass destruction and the impact of that on our fabric as a nation. And the homeland defense and what we're doing there is very key, but the committed people, the adversary and a weapon of mass destruction is something that we all need to think through and not hear any one person has the answer. It's going to take we, collective, working together to try to keep ahead of those types of situations.

Dr. Davis: General Pace, challenges and opportunities in your AOR?

General Pace: Challenges and opportunities are the same thing. Number one for our country is homeland defense. And although that's not my AOR, I want to put that on the table because I believe we're going to have to get that right.

Within my AOR, I would just use two examples. Number one, my responsibility, part of my responsibility, is to articulate to our own leadership the importance of the AOR. I don't think our country understands the importance of Central and South America and the Caribbean to our health and prosperity. Our friends down there are very, very good friends. Our resources that we receive in trade, especially just for one example, the oil from Venezuela outstrips the import of oil from any other country in the world. So we have some very important interests in that AO.

But as we look at the allocation of resources, just to the military piece of doing business overseas, I need to do a better job of articulating to the leadership why they should allocate more resources. Not to take away from the other CINCs, but to allocate more resources to my area of responsibility. Right now we spend about $1 billion within my AO on a yearly basis on all things military. The good news is that's about twice as much as it was just about four or five years ago. The bad news is, from where I sit, at least to be able to compete intellectually, is Bosnia 1.3 times more important to the United States than all of Central and South America? Is Kosovo three times more important to the United States than all of Central and South America? Is Iraq of the same importance?

The answer to those questions may be yes, they may be no, but the bottom line is we need to take a look at how we allocate resources around the world and if, in fact, we have it right elsewhere and I believe we do, then we need to take a look at do we have it right in Central and South America, and I think we do not.

Dr. Davis: General Franks, in your homogenous AOR?

General Franks: I identify myself, I guess, with the comments of both General Holland and General Pace. At the end— Look, at the end of the day, this is about interests. It's about our national interests. It's about definitions of those interests in categories of important and vital and critical and so forth.

In the Central Region, we have 25 countries. We have the nexus of three continents. We have 65 percent of the proven reserves of petroleum on the planet. We move 45 percent of that petroleum through the Straits of Hormuz. We have represented arguably all of the nation's major religions. Six languages. And we operate daily on this— once again, on this continuum which I described previously.

If in fact it is in our national interest to be in the region, then it is also an imperative that we recognize the frictions which exist between operating in a region such as this where we see potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a variety of hubs of terrorism, some of the most influential and capable narcotics growth and movement that we see on the planet. A variety of interests within the region which do not always agree with each other. The entirety of this region and our relationships within this region in pursuit of our national interests, in fact, are at friction. As General Holland said, with our ability to take care of our people, witness the attack on the Cole. The threats which exist in a variety of places around the world are very real. They are very dedicated. They're very well resourced. They're not by accident, and it calls to us to determine whether engagement activities within these regions are in the vital interest of the United States of America. In my view, in this region, our vital interests are as described in terms of importance to the United States of America.

But as we decide what our future structure will look like, as we decide what our nation and her military will do in these vital areas around the world, we must also realize that we put ourselves, our citizens, our men and women in uniform, in harm's way. And so I suppose that would be my comment about what the challenges are for the future, as well as where I think we see the opportunities.

Dr. Davis: Thank you. General Robertson?

General Robertson: If you haven't figured it out, you hit a key question. This is— When you talk challenges, a CINC hits his stride. The hard part will be keeping the comments under control.

Let me approach three challenges from the prism of my perspective at TRANSCOM. And I would— I'd normally use Charlie's RPM character acronym to talk about— And I'll change it just a little bit, just to add spice and variety. I'd like to talk about challenge one, the health of the force is a concern. People. We need to make sure that we continue to aggressively attack recruiting and retention challenges that we all face. We can't do the job with a bunch of beginners out there. We need to retain the experience that we have on the force, and we need to continue to recruit top quality people, and we need to pay what we need to pay to do that.

Aging fleets. Health of the force. In the Air Force, I have five of the six older airplanes in the Air Force. It is a concern to me. KC135s, for example. I was briefing General Ryan last night before he came over here on our tanker requirement study. As a KC135 passes 40 years of age it's programmatically projected to start to be replaced 2013 and finish replacement by 2040. That will make the last KC135 80 years old when we replace it. That makes me stay awake at night sometimes thinking about that. And just the problem, when you watch the exponential curves associated with maintaining an aging fleet, although it continues to be very reliable using the KC135 as an example.

The problem is in how long you have to keep it in depot maintenance to keep it operational causes resource problems. Do I have enough KC135s to do the problem. And that's just the tanker side, not to mention an old C130 fleet and an old C141 fleet and an old C5A fleet. So the health of the fleet is a challenge for all of us.

There's a process challenge. I call it a process challenge because as we become more expeditionary, more of a force projection force, our ability to get the troops to the fight rapidly is a process challenge and Hal Gehman and I work that very hard in joint deployment process. How to get— Train the troops to mobilize rapidly and to get them on scene rapidly, and it's all tied in with transformation in the Army and the Air Force as their expeditionary force concept. And it's all the services are attacking this process challenge of being able to fight from CONUS America into SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM, Korea, and the other places around the world that we have to fight. Far reaches of the globe.

And then the third challenge for me is threat. The Cole is the most recent example. Khobar Towers. Tommy Franks and Tommy Schwartz and Pete are responsible for my forces, the force protection of my forces when they're in their AOR. I know well that they are not resourced to do that. With every airplane that I have flitting through their AOR in places that they don't have forces to protect me. So we work that on a daily basis. But the boldness of the folks out there who are willing to drive up to my ships without clearance, the boldness of folks who refuel my airplanes in Timbuktu, Country X out in the far reaches of the world, is a problem. And is a challenge that we all are going to have to confront in the coming months and— Well, we've been confronting it, and we're just going to have to get better and better at it.

I spent day before yesterday with Hal Gehman talking about how we do force protection in the transportation business when we operate in such strange places around the world, and it is a complicated business. And we work on it every day. But those are the kinds of challenges that concern the transportation CINC.
Dr. Davis: Thank you, General Robertson. Admiral Gehman?

Admiral Gehman: I would wrap up all of the comments of the CINCs beside me into two packages. I agree with all of the "eaches" that they brought up, but I would wrap them into these two packages. The first package is a challenge for us to all realize that we are in a period of transition. That means new threats, new challengers, new methods, new technology, and that the challenge that we're going to face is going to be a challenge posed by an unexpected and unanticipated adversary coming at us from an unexpected and unanticipated direction, coming at us probably with a weapon or a procedure that we do not currently anticipate. If you— And several of those weapons of mass destruction, technology, which were mentioned here. If you accept that, then you get a slightly different equation, a slightly different output.

The second package that I would offer, again, wraps up some of the comments of the CINCs here. They probably would not associate themselves with this, but that is the package of striking the right balance to make sure that the CINCs priorities and the CINCs voices are heard and understood and supported in the process of resourcing. They— Several of the CINCs here had several "eaches" that they need this, or they need that, or they want this or they want that. The problem is that the process that we currently have only partially recognizes the CINCs requirements. It doesn't ignore the CINCs requirements, but it only partially recognizes them. So those are the two challenges that I think we're going to have to face for the future, and they kind of wrap up everything we heard to the left.

Dr. Davis: Thank you very much, Admiral Gehman. Another issue that was raised explicitly during the recent presidential campaign was that of missile defenses. How important a priority is national and theater missile defense— General Pace, you already mentioned homeland defense— For your theater or for the nation and should the United States pursue missile defense technologies even if major allies and regional partners decline to join us in a collaborative endeavor? General, Pace, would you like to start?

General Pace: I can start, but I'm probably the one least likely to have the right answer. Because in my AO, missile threat is non-existent.

Dr. Davis: We're drawing upon your previous fleet experience.

General Pace: Drawing on my what? [Laughter]

Missile defense is very important, and it is part of homeland defense, in my opinion. We should, in fact, improve our technology and go after the capabilities that are required. I have not studied missile defense to the level that I would like to have had to answer that question properly. And I truly believe that the limited knowledge I have, and the zero responsibility right now in my theater makes me improperly prepared to be the spokesman for that.

But I would say this overall, and that is that we owe it to our country to insure that— As a military to insure that we are always ready to protect our vital interests. And if we're looking at asymmetric ways of getting to our country, and there's no one right now who's going to come after us one on one, if we're looking at asymmetric ways to do that, missiles are certainly a way to do it from a stand off and we must have a capability to defend ourselves. I should leave it at that, because there's much more to it that I have no studied.

Dr. Davis: Well, the two generals to your right, I think, can answer that question with a little more experience from his AOR and his virtual AOR in Korea. General Franks?

General Franks: I believe on the day when weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery no longer represent a threat to the United States of America, then we should consider abandoning our search for protection against those weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery.

As my friend from SOUTHCOM said, I'm not the best guy to talk to about a national missile defense program. Perhaps I can talk about theater missile defense which, if you think about it, is national missile defense to the nations in our region. We encourage them through cooperative defense initiatives to build active and passive approaches to protect themselves and be a part of the coalition we may establish in the future. Specifically, in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, we're working a Cooperative Defense Initiative with theater missile defense. And our approach there is not to describe to the nations what it is that they should purchase. This is not a sell America approach. Rather, it is to try to take the plug and play capabilities that exist, build upon them, try to figure out how to enhance them and bring them together in a way that provides for theater missile defense. So that's it in a coalition context.

In terms of a joint context, it is my view that we should continue exactly the way we are now with our efforts to bring Army, Navy and Air Force assets on line as soon as we can in order to provide lower level and high level protection in the theater missile defense environment.

Dr. Davis: Thank you very much. General Robertson, with respect to protection of important APODS? How important are missile defense technologies capabilities to you?

General Robertson: Well, that's interesting you should ask that. We work very, very closely with Tommy and Tommy for the 2 MTW scenarios and we worked very closely with them as we worked our way through the soon to be released new mobility requirements study to determine the effect of missile defenses or the effects of weapons of mass destruction on our primary APODS and SPODS and their AORs and what effect missile defenses might have to ameliorate that threat. And then what we would need to do operationally and tactically to work around those threats. It is absolutely critical in the— And as the situation continues to evolve, not just the delivery of weapons of mass destruction by theater and intercontinental missiles is a problem, missiles that attack airplanes, missiles that attack ships are also a problem. Defenses against this threat, rapidly evolving threat and technologically growing threat, will not go away.

And it's something that we have to continue to push our technology to address. It will significantly affect the war fight. Fifty percent of my capability to deliver troops and material to the theaters is in the commercial fleet. As soon as the first— You name it, the first weapon of mass destruction hits, I lose that fifty percent capability, and I have to go to transload at a clean site to get material into the AOR. Significantly cutting into the closure of the halting force and in whatever AOR we're talking about. So I vote with the group that votes that we need to push this technology as fast as we can.

Dr. Davis: Thank you very much. Admiral Gehman?

Admiral Gehman: This issue's been studied by panel after panel after panel and we got it— Our current policy is one that I support and understand. The priority is lower tier theater ballistic missile defense systems first, upper tier systems second, national missile defense third. That's the way the threat is arrayed. This is an example of a new emerging high technology cheap weapon that is available to— We've already seen it. We know it's out there. We would ignore it at our folly.

Dr. Davis: General Holland, you were the first of our panel members to reference the WMD, the weapons of mass destruction issue. And indeed in our discussion of missile defenses, we've had a crossover between the WMD issue and the ballistic missile defense issue. And obviously there is a connection. Obviously there are some separate issues to consider. With respect to WMD specifically, one of the issues that has been debated in recent years in that six-sided building down the street, is preemption. Should we consider using our special operations forces for preemptive WMD missions?

General Holland: Well, as you well know, special operations is involved in a lot of things that we're doing with weapons of mass destruction, as is a lot of the other organizations. The preemptive piece, it also begs the question what is the will? You've got to have a will if you're going to be preemptive. There's different ways to be preemptive. You can look at the technology and be preemptive on the technology. You can stop it before it gets developed. You can stop a key component from it delivering that capability. Or, if you're not preemptive, you can wait until the consequence happens, and then if you really feel— And to me, it's not a matter of if, it's a matter of when, then you're dealing with a consequence and can we at that point as we peel back the onion, say, "Did we do everything that we could to stop that event from happening?"

And to me, WMD still is the biggest threat that we have against the national fabric of we as America. And just as Tommy Franks had talked about it, it was a national concern for our countries over in Southwest Asia. And this is something that we— Is not only sobering, but it's also one of those areas that makes your head hurt because there's so many parts of it that we still don't know. Still, when you take a look at things like bio and chemical, our best indicator, unfortunately, is when we bring that soldier, sailor, airman, marine, back from the front, and we say, "Here's what we have that's running against us." We do not have the detection sensors that we need to be able to provide that information back. So there's still a lot of uncertainty. And this is one area that we will continue to do all that we can from special ops command, but it will also be something that we all need to come together on and work at this.

Not only the technology piece, but it's that insight, that intell. part of it on what is actionable. And then from actionable intelligence, what can you do from a preemptive standpoint?

But I'll go back to the preemptive piece. We need to have the will to do that. Without the will, then we will not go to the next step.

Dr. Davis: Thank you very much. Admiral Gehman, one final question on the WMD set of issues. What types of training and exercise regimes do you believe are appropriate and necessary to meet this challenge?

Admiral Gehman: The role of the Department of Defense in this case, particularly in the United States, is a supporting role by law and also by decision the first responders and to any kind of WMD event and also the person in charge of the recovery from a WMD event will be one civilian agency or another. It might be the Department of Justice or FEMA.

Clearly, the training that we need to do our core engineering security transportation kinds of competencies, those are the competencies that will be required in the case of a really terrible event which is beyond the capability of state and local officials to take care of. The Department of Defense cannot replicate national health system. We cannot replicate the national bank of immunizations. We cannot replicate the state and local police. Nor should we.

What we should train on and what we should be experts at is saving lives and mitigating the circumstances using our core competencies, and there's tons and tons of training to be done which help us in our day to day military role and also are directly applicable to saving American lives.

Dr. Davis: Thank you very much. Moving on now to our third set of questions dealing with broader strategic political considerations, I wonder— I guess General Franks first for you. As overseas basing infrastructures contract and more and more constraints are placed on U.S. operations overseas, how are or will your requirements and operational planning change?

General Franks: As we consider— Of course in Central Command, we have very few forces permanently stationed overseas. Our naval component, in fact, is located in Manama Bahrain and we maintain that component for it all the time. On a given day in Central Command, we will range between 24 and 30,000 sailors, airmen, soldiers, and marines in the region.

But on the continuum of operations that moves up to our plans for major theater war, we have certain planning requirements. And as we consider each of those planning requirements, we think about things like how long will it take us to be in position in order to defend, if in fact that is a plan that we're considering? And then we take a look at General Robertson's capability, and the capability we have nationally to move forces forward. And as we subtract one from the other, we will make some determinations about how many people and how many assets, how much equipment do we need to have positioned for it?

And so that becomes, then, our forward presence and our forward stationing capability for equipment.

We are in a good situation at this point in time, in terms of our relationships with the nations forward that permit us to station forward presence people, as well as forward presence equipment. I can't comment further to the specifics of losing the capabilities we have forward because I don't believe that's in the cards.

Dr. Davis: Would anyone else like to weigh in on that question? The basing contraction? General Robertson?

General Robertson: It's obviously very critical to me. I— There is a good news side to this. We recognized about five years ago that most of our overseas basing was built at the height of the Cold War and was aging rapidly. When I have to support two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, the ability to throughput cargo and throughput personnel rapidly is critical to the war fighting CINC's ability to pursue his campaign. So we aggressively attacked this structure.

When you stop to consider that when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, I had 40 overseas locations where I had forces permanently stationed to provide that throughput capability, almost 15,000 folks. As we drew back and paid one peace dividend after another through the '90s, I am down to six bases in Europe and six bases in the Pacific that we have identified as our primary throughput bases and into which we will place our primary investment. And that investment has been going on, and we're getting healthier every day.

And then into the AORs, we work at that on a daily basis, especially as we go through exercises to look at fuel capacity, ramp capacity, throughput capacity, ability of the structure to support us in a WMD environment and that the kinds of things we have discussed. Infrastructure is absolutely critical to being able to get to the fight.

And so, oh by the way, is interoperability and international alliances. We could not do what we do, 2,000 sorties around the world a week into 50 different countries around the week without the will of the countries, of the hosts who allow us to come in. And as we work through in a time of crisis, the diplomatic clearance process, the accessibility process, those relationships we establish in peacetime are very, very critical. And that's why we do work them on a day to day basis.

Dr. Davis: Thank you very much, General. Admiral Gehman, what do both the Cole attack and the Kosovo operation tell us about the future of warfare?

Admiral Gehman: It's important that we take the attack on the Cole and also the attack on the two American embassies in Africa as well as the Khobar Towers and put them in their historical context. The attack on the Cole is not an aberrant, out of the blue, off the scale event. If you go back to Beirut, Beirut barracks bombing, World Trade Center, Oklahoma City, and plot all these things on a graph, it all of a sudden it becomes pretty predictable that we are— We constitute a target-rich environment. We are kind of naïve about our own personal security. That the people who want to cause the explosions are finding more and clever ways to find these explosions. And that it's going to happen again.

As long as we are an open society, a society that feels very strongly that we have a duty, an obligation or a mission to be engaged around the world and to be in a lot of places in the world where there are characters who don't appreciate us being there. We think we need to be there to create regional stability and other kinds of things, we are leaving ourselves vulnerable to these kind of attacks, and they are going to happen.
So I would hope that the audience would not the attack on the U.S.S. Cole as some kind of an aberrant off the scale, unpredictable kind of a thing. It's quite predictable, and kind of consistent with the trends that we see in the world. Our responsibility, of course, is to mitigate— Minimize the risk and mitigate the effects. We owe it to our— All of our people who are engaged, not just uniform military, by the way. We owe it to all of our people who are conducting this engagement strategy on behalf of the United States to mitigate and to minimize the risk as best we can.

But I think that the lesson we should learn on the attack on the Cole is that this is the nature of the challenge that we're going to face. It's consistent with what we saw in the two American embassies, it's consistent with what we saw in Khobar Towers, consistent with what we saw in Beirut. And you can kind of take a line and just draw it on out to the future, and I predict we'll see it again. It might be five years before we see it again, it might be one year before we see it again.

Dr. Davis: Admiral Gehman, just a follow up question and relating back to your previous incarnation at SACLANT. I wonder if you could comment on the Kosovo operation in terms of how we prosecuted that operation? We had restrictive rules of engagement, we had political debates over consensus about the operation, we did this as a— Through an alliance framework, but there were a lot of national activities. Would you care to comment on Kosovo as the— In terms of future planning for warfare?

Admiral Gehman: The Kosovo air operation is illustrative and worthy of studying. There has been a lot of nitpicking about the fact that one of our allies, or two of our allies, that their equipment wouldn't do this, or their piece of equipment wouldn't do that. And I don't believe that that's germane. The important thing is to remember, is that a very large coalition managed to get its act together, and a very large coalition of democracies, peace loving democracies who don't like to drop bombs on people managed to get its political will in order. That we managed to put thousands of airplanes in a very small amount of air space and they didn't run into each other, and they didn't shoot each other shows that the alliance is basically interoperable.

Oh, yes, there are all kinds of things we need to fix. But the fact of the matter is that many, many of our allies contributed very significantly in very, very significant ways. And so all in all it has to be viewed as a success story. There are lots of improvements that we should take serious. I would suggest to me, my own military judgement, is the one improvement that all of our allies and American forces need to address is the top priority— This is just me speaking— Is secure communications. I'm not so concerned about whether or not everybody has precision bombing capability. Everybody has laser designator capability. Or everybody has GPS guided through the clouds weapons systems or not. That would be nice, but I don't think that's such a key point.

But we conducted that operation too much in an un-secure radio environment and in the future, if you cannot talk on a secure radio you probably will not be invited to the party.

Dr. Davis: General Franks, the future of warfare, as you see it?

General Franks: I'm not especially a student of strategy, but I believe that strategies are employed by a lot of people who don't even understand exactly what a strategy is. That being that a strategy involves the components of ends, ways and means. And I agree totally with what Admiral Gehman just said. As we think about where we're going in the future, and as we think about where we have spent our time on the operating continuum in the past, and as we think about what the future may hold in terms of asymmetry, end, ways, means. There are people who employ a strategy, even though they may not even understand the term strategy, by simply using different ways, different means in order to accomplish a desired goal over time.

I believe that what Admiral Gehman said is correct about the world in which we're going to be called to serve in the future. There is just direct truth in that. What we have to do, is we have to acclimate. We have to adjust to the realities of asymmetry as an approach to achieve end states of many of these well-trained, very capable, very dedicated and quite serious foes, enemies and potential enemies that we're going to see in the future. And I suspect the challenge that we face is to move through our thought processes to address intellectually the implications of what I just said on the way we structure, the way we man, the way we equip, the way we identify our military occupational specialties in both the near term and the far term at the same time while we are identifying the processes that will make sure that we keep up with the requirement to be as relevant tomorrow against these new strategies as we have been in the past.

Dr. Davis: Thank you very much, General Franks. General Holland?

General Holland: I echo previous remarks. I think also what's important is we think back, and it goes back to something that Tony Robertson had talked about. You know, as we all flash back to 1989 and just coming out of Europe now, I see what happened. During a time when we felt like that peace is broken out all over the world, we don't have any more problems, everybody's going to be peace loving. We can come back to America, we can not worry about having to continue to engage around the world. And as a result of that, we did not put money into a lot of areas that really need money. And the reason we didn't is because we didn't think that there was a need.

And now you see what has happened over those last 10 or 12 years, we've cut the force by 40 percent. We have probably been in four times as many operations as we were before, and is the world really safer than what it was in 1988? And so the caution as we go through this, and we all know that North and South Korea, there's a lot of discussions going on. But whenever something happens and we feel like, "Well, there was an MTW that we thought that was at risk and now that that's over with, now we don't have to worry about that part of the world." Because the importance of us continuing our close ties with our allies, the coalition piece of it, that will kind of give us the information we need so that we maintain our relevancy well into the world ahead. Because the only thing that is certain is our world is going to change. The threats are going to change. But we need to make sure that we're adaptable to what those changes are rather than wait until the crisis occurs, and then peel back the onion and find out, you know, woe is us. Why did not we anticipate that better?

Dr. Davis: Thank you very much. In the few moments remaining now, I'd like to open the floor for questions. Who would like to ask the first question to the CINCs? And you really have to make yourself known? Yes, right. Michelle Flournoy, right here in the front? Microphone?

Audience: Thank you. Michelle Flournoy, National Defense University. As CINCs you are all overseeing the development of dozens of contingency plans. And in fact, contingency planning has become one of the primary means that we've developed to manage this uncertainty that you've all talked about. And yet in the Pentagon in our force planning, we have tended to focus on two— What's really become two canonical cases. The major theater war in ... (inaudible) and a major theater war on the Korean peninsula. My question is, given the uncertainty that you talked about, and the pace of change that you expect, would the department be better served, whatever the four sizing criteria, whether it's 2 MTWs or something else, to broaden the scenario set that we use in force planning to include a wider range or threats, a wider range of potential end state objectives, operating conditions, concepts of operation, would we be better served in this uncertain environment to broaden the scenario set that we use in force planning in developing the capabilities that we provide to you to actually deal with the world?
Dr. Davis: That's such an important question, I think you all should take a stab at it. So why don't we start with Admiral Gehman?

Admiral Gehman: I think that Michelle is right. And I believe that's done. They may not be formal contingency plans in that they have a number and they're on the shelf and they're approved by the Chairman or the Secretary of Defense. But what-iffing and contingency planning goes on in CINCs headquarters all the time. You may be right in the sense that perhaps the process should get more formal and that that may lead to new insights into requirements and things like that. But I believe these CINCs are all constantly doing contingency planning.

Dr. Davis: General Robertson?

General Robertson: Michelle, I would say about the same thing that Hal did. We might be better served to formalize the process a little more than we do now, but I drive a lot of the contingency planning now because it is so critical that we get out of the box rapidly and to have at least the first seven days planned and prepared as far as what's going to go is absolutely critical. Because I tell the CINCs, my job is to embarrass you by putting the first airplane on your ramp before you're ready to go, because I don't want to be the one blamed for slowing down the U.S. response.

And so we are driving towards the kind of mindset to look at other than the two big war plans to try to— Just to speed up the response to whatever the crisis may be, whether it be WMD or whether it just be flooding in Mozambique. Those kinds of things are critical to us, and they're going to become more critical because as information becomes a major driver, our ability to respond is going to become more and more of a spotlight issue.

Dr. Davis: Thank you. General Franks?

General Franks: Michelle, I'm a little bit nervous about giving you a very simple answer to a very complex issue. Let me just, I guess, begin by saying that I agree with the point that I think you made toward the end of your question. That being a question, should we broaden our modeling of issues that we face in this new world beyond the major theater and to include the contingencies that we work.

And the short answer, from my perspective is, yes, we should. Fundamentally, there's an issue in my mind about how it is that we choose to size forces. Do we choose to size against the high end, or do we choose to size against the aggregate of low ends in the world in which we live? Knowing the work that you have done recently, I don't— I have not seen the product of that, so I don't have a bias on that particular work. But in my view, much of the asymmetry in the future which we will see against U.S. interests will occur at a point on this continuum less than at the MTW end. There are implications for training, officer development, for structure, for equipping. There are implications for a national intelligence architecture that becomes a bit more predictive than in fact we were prior to the First World War, the Second World War, the Korean War. And you can continue with that sort of line of thought.

The implications of all of that structure in order to be able to live in a full spectrum world, we talk about a lot of things in terms of a full spectrum. The fact is, that this planet offers full spectrum challenges. And whatever modeling set we use to get at that is going to be important to the relevance of our forces in the future.

Dr. Davis: General Pace?

General Pace: Michelle, I appreciate the opportunity to answer that question. It think that contingency plans are as significant opportunity for the CINCs to identify the capabilities required in their theaters. An that when I develop a contingency plan and send it to DC to the Joint Staff for articulation in the interagency community here, that not only am I providing the way I would envision solving whatever the problem is, but I'm also feeding to the joint world and to the service chiefs specific the kind of capabilities that I'm looking to them to provide to me. So it's my way of identifying future needs.

I can't think of a contingency in my AO right now that would not be well served by the structure that has been created to serve the two major theaters of war. So I'm very comfortable that my contingencies will be served very well by the forces that have been identified for a larger event. Certainly in my area of operations, I'm looking for forces that can get there rapidly. When they get there will have a very light footprint because I'm looking to a less mature base structure, and I'm looking to perhaps— Responding to humanitarian or major disasters where footprints on the ground may not be what you need. You need help, but you don't necessarily need people living on the ground. So sea basing for me and rapid deployment by air into and out of an AO are important. But the contingency plans are the way that I would identify the capabilities that I need.

Dr. Davis: General Holland?

General Holland: Yes, Michelle, on our side I see contingencies and the aspect of where you're coming from kind of synonymous with SOCOM. Because we get involved with most of the contingencies. The other thing about contingencies, when you look at a major theater war, there are different challenges even in the planning process, who you need to get approval for, what can you do, the amount of risk you're willing to take. So there's a big difference between the scenario of a contingency versus an MTW. And we got to make sure of that mind set. Yes, we need to win those major theater wars. You know, that is our reason for being. But on the contingencies, the scenarios we go through, it becomes a very good learning tool for each one of us to make sure that our forces can take those challenges and meet them.

And I think the joint experimentation, the joint forces command, there's some great opportunities there where we can look at those scenarios and make sure we're better prepared for those when they do come about.

Dr. Davis: Another question? I think there was a question over here? Please identify yourself?

Audience: General Naumann, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. I do not want to ask a question, but to offer a comment on an issue which you raised, Jackie, earlier on, as one of the few Europeans in this audience. And that is the issue of national missile defense.

I think national missile defense is a clear example of how one can get the consultation process in NATO wrong. And I think we have every reason to think so, how we can do better since the issue will come back to us regardless who will eventually move into the White House. And we keep our fingers crossed that you will have a decision soon.

I think there are a couple of issues which you need to consider, and one I think falls into the domain of the CINCs. First, I think no one over there in Europe will deny— I should say the obligation of every American President to do everything he could to protect American territory. And if there is one argument which was absolutely flawed, then it was the stupid argument of the coupling. I think the contrary is true. The better America is protected, the bigger the preparedness of the United States of America will be to project power. And this is to the benefit of the allies.

Secondly, I think one has to consider the issue of the stability, the notion of stability which the ABM treaty seems to give. So it's not the question whether we will really preserve the letter of the treaty, but how we will make sure that the spirit of the treaty is preserved, and that is more or less this notion of mutually assured vulnerability. That I think is important for the Russians. It's what we have to avoid is to humiliate the Russians; otherwise they will go back into a futile attempt to launch something like an arms competition.

Third point, which is entirely an American obligation. You have to manage your relationship with China and you have to make sure this will be— Relationship of a benign partnership. Difficult task for you. And I think this. If you explain properly to your European allies how you want to do this, then the NMD issue can be solved.

And then my final point, theater missile defense. I think the really weak spot in this entire argument was that sea to missile defense was not addressed at all. But this is in all expeditionary forces. The weak spot. So if you do not have a capability to protect deployed expeditionary forces, be they Americans or be they allies, an opponent will have a chance to really drive a wedge into our coalition. And for that reason we need to find a combination between NMD and TMD and I'm sure if you do this properly and if you avoid the last point, which we got wrong, to explain in a better way than the administration did to our allies why you want to go for NMD, then I think we can avoid a major transatlantic rift. And that is the least thing we can afford.
So my invitation to the CINCs is make sure that we find a solution which allows for a theater missile defense as well and invite your incoming administration to seek a link between NMD and TMD. Thank you.

Dr. Davis: And perhaps even sustain the MEADS collaboration. Any other questions? One final question for the CINC? Yes, over here.

Audience: Hi, I'm Major Wilson, Assistant Professor, U.S. Military Academy. Gentlemen, how do our four military sales calculated into your theater engagement planning, specifically in terms of supporting the engagement strategy? I'm thinking more specifically on the shaping aspect of that strategy? Additionally, in reference to the recognized need to sustain, modernize and re-capitalize U.S. forces, how critical a factor might FMS be in that future sustainment, modernization, re-capitalization of the force?

Dr. Davis: General Franks?

General Franks: Our approach to shaping has to do with our presence forces. It also has to do with how much International Military Education and Training, IMET, we may have going on. A variety of security assistance activities that we may have with a given partner. Or a given ally. The way we conduct our exercises, the entirety of our security assistance approach, where we have military to military contact, and the business of foreign military sales is very much a part of that issue for a very simple and very pragmatic reason. And that is it enhances our ability to cooperate, collaborate and operate with similar systems. And so I guess my short answer would be it's very much a part of the way we engage.

I think the trick for the commander is to be sure that there is much more to it. There is much more involved than just an approach that attempts to "sell America." There are issues of credibility, there are issues of affordability, there are issues associated with the way we need to be able to collaborate and cooperate, and they will vary by country. But the short answer is very much a part of our engagement and shaping approach.

Dr. Davis: Before we close this session and thank the CINCs for their insights into these issues and the time they've spent with us this morning, which was just tremendous— I think you all will agree— I'd like to announce that today's lunch will be a buffet in the room behind us. We ask that you exit out the doors to your left and proceed down the hall into Salon 3 to the buffet line. Quickly get your food and come back here. They're going to open the sliding doors behind us so that you may return to your seats rather quickly so that you can be here and seated in time for Dr. Rice to begin her address.

Again, I think it is appropriate now to thank the CINCs for their time. [Applause]